Inferring Transactions from Financial Statements*

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.     

The Intergenerational Supply of Loggers Under Conditions of Declining Economic Well-Being

This paper addresses the supply-side explanations of a logger shortage by estimating an occupational choice model that considers the role of earnings, nonpecuniary determinants and intergenerational factors. Our results showed that: (1) relative earnings have no statistically significant effect on career choice; (2) improvement in the public image of loggers substantially increases entry into logging; and (3) a strong intergenerational supply linkage exists but is currently being eroded.     

On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd‐) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access

We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.     

Wealth Effects and the Valuation of Common Access Facilities: Some Calculations*

Using a CES utility function modified to allow for zero usage of one commodity, this paper calculates the relative difference between compensating and equivalent variation measures of the welfare loss due to withdrawal of a commodity, for various plausible values of the relevant demand function parameters (income elasticity, expenditure share and substitution elasticity). Contrary to what is frequently asserted these differences can be quite significant     

Trading volume theories and their implications for empirical information content studies*

Abstract. In this study we explore implications of extant trading volume theories for empirical information content studies. Using a simple general equilibrium model, we analyze and illustrate how trading volume reacts to information conveyed by an event. We show that a trading volume reaction to the release of an informational event is an increasing function of dispersion in belief changes among investors caused by information in the event, rather than belief changes per se. We also show that because of a possibility of no significant price change, a price effect study alone is not sufficient to accurately assess the information content of an event and a simultaneous volume effect study is necessary. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient les conséquences des théories existantes relatives au volume de titres négociés sur les études à contenu informationnel empirique. À l'aide d'un simple modèle d'équilibre général, ils analysent et illustrent comment le volume de titres négociés réagit à l'information transmise par un événement. Leur étude révèle que le volume de titres négociés par suite de la publication d'un événement informationnel croît en fonction de la dispersion dans les changements d'attitude chez les investisseurs attribuables à l'information que livre l'événement, plutôt qu'en fonction des changements d'attitude eux-mêmes. Elle démontre également qu'en raison de la possibilité qu'il n'y ait aucun changement de prix important, l'étude du comportement des prix risque de ne pas suffire à elle seule à évaluer avec précision le contenu informationnel d'un événement, et qu'une étude simultanée du comportement du volume de titres négociés s'impose.     

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENT

We experimentally investigate the impact of income redistribution on voluntary contributions by groups of four subjects. We compare equalizing and unequalizing redistribution. Our data are consistent with the neutrality theorem: Redistribution does not affect the amount of voluntarily provided public good at the group level. However, at the individual level, subjects tend to underadjust with respect to the Nash prediction. We also observe an insignificant adjustment asymmetry between the poor and the rich: Subjects who become poorer adjust their contribution by a larger absolute amount than subjects who become richer. Finally, poor subjects tend to overcontribute significantly more than rich subjects.     

Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.     

Crowding Out and the Informativeness of Security Prices

Individual investors trade less agressively on any particular piece of information as more investors observe it. The trades of the new investors observing a piece of information “crowd out” some of the trades of the old investors who observe that same piece of information. This paper shows that when traders are risk averse, these crowding out effects lead the proportions of traders who choose to observe one signal versus another to differ from the proportions that maximize the informativeness of prices.