Financing Constraints and Workplace Safety

We present evidence that financing frictions adversely impact investment in workplace safety, with implications for worker welfare and firm value. Using several identification strategies, we find that injury rates increase with leverage and negative cash flow shocks, and decrease with positive cash flow shocks. We show that firm value decreases substantially with injury rates. Our findings suggest that investment in worker safety is an economically important margin on which firms respond to financing constraints.     

Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.     

Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High‐Frequency World

We describe the process through which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes filings “publicly available.” For a sample of Form 4 (insider trade) filings, we show that, during the period we examine, the majority of filings are available to paying subscribers of the SEC's public dissemination system (PDS) feed before they are posted to the EDGAR website, and so provide subscribers and their clients with a private advantage. We show that this advantage translates into an economically significant trading advantage, and prices, volumes, and spreads respond to the news contained in filings beginning around 30 seconds before public posting. These findings indicate that the SEC dissemination process does not always provide a level playing field and that the meaning of publicly available information in capital markets is no longer simple or obvious. In response to our study, the SEC launched an investigation and agreed to eliminate the PDS timing advantage.     

Human Capital,Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.     

COX REGRESSION WITH ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF WAITING TIME: THE NEW ORLEANS YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC OF 1853

Event data can often be analysed using different concepts of waiting time. Our application offers three choices: calendar-time, age, and duration of residence in New Orleans. We exploit the semi-parametric features of Cox regression and estimate parallel specifications in which mortality risk is treated as an arbitrary function of one of the three alternative time measures, while the remaining two enter the hazard parametrically. Comparisons of the parameter estimates with the corresponding estimates of the baseline hazards form the crux of a simple specification checking procedure. In our formal treatment we rely on Aalen's Multiplicative Intensity formulation and tackle complications such as left-truncation, functional form specification, and choice-based sampling. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Local Aggregate Effects of Minimum Wage Increases

Using variation in minimum wages across cities and controlling for differences in business-cycle factors and long-run local economic trends, we find that following minimum wage increases, both, prices and nominal spending rise modestly. These gains are larger for certain subcategories of goods such as food away from home and in locations where low-wage workers account for a larger share of employment. Further, minimum wage increases are associated with reduced total debt among households with low credit scores, higher auto debt, and increased access to credit.     

Strategic Complementarity,Stabilization Policy,and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study's key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications; specifically, in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.     

Are Analysts’ Recommendations Informative? Intraday Evidence on the Impact of Time Stamp Delays

We demonstrate that time stamps reported in I/B/E/S for analysts’ recommendations released during trading hours are systematically delayed. Using newswire‐reported time stamps, we find 30‐minute returns of 1.83% (?2.10%) for upgrades (downgrades), but for this subset of recommendations we find corresponding returns of ?0.07% (?0.09%) using I/B/E/S‐reported time stamps. We also examine the information content of recommendations relative to management guidance and earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that analysts’ recommendations are the most important information disclosure channel examined.