Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting Behavior

In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are “ambiguity complements.” Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to “hedge” the candidates' ambiguity.     

A Theory of Trading Volume

A theory of trading volume is developed based on assumptions that market agents frequently revise their demand prices and randomly encounter potential trading partners. The model describes two distinct ways informational events affect trading volume. One is consistent with conjectures made by empirical researchers that investor disagreement leads to increased trading. But the observation of abnormal trading volume does not necessarily imply disagreement, and volume can increase even if investors interpret the information identically, if they also have had divergent prior expectations. Simulation tests support the model and are used to contrast the random-pairing environment with costless market clearing. Volume is lower in the costly market, and volume increases caused by an informational event persist after the event period. This is consistent with existing empirical evidence and suggests that markets do not immediately clear all orders or that investors have demands to recontract.     

Wealth Effects and the Valuation of Common Access Facilities: Some Calculations*

Using a CES utility function modified to allow for zero usage of one commodity, this paper calculates the relative difference between compensating and equivalent variation measures of the welfare loss due to withdrawal of a commodity, for various plausible values of the relevant demand function parameters (income elasticity, expenditure share and substitution elasticity). Contrary to what is frequently asserted these differences can be quite significant     

On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd‐) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access

We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

Monetary Policy Implementation in a Negative Rate Environment

To analyze monetary policy implementation in a negative rate environment, we add the option to exchange central bank reserves for cash to the standard workhorse model of monetary policy implementation (Poole 1968). Importantly, we show that monetary policy can be constrained when the target overnight rate is below the yield on cash. At this point, the overnight rate equals the yield on cash instead of the target rate. Modifications to the implementation framework, such as a reserve requirement that varies with cash withdrawals, can help restore the implementation of monetary policy such that the overnight rate equals the target rate.     

Trading volume theories and their implications for empirical information content studies*

Abstract. In this study we explore implications of extant trading volume theories for empirical information content studies. Using a simple general equilibrium model, we analyze and illustrate how trading volume reacts to information conveyed by an event. We show that a trading volume reaction to the release of an informational event is an increasing function of dispersion in belief changes among investors caused by information in the event, rather than belief changes per se. We also show that because of a possibility of no significant price change, a price effect study alone is not sufficient to accurately assess the information content of an event and a simultaneous volume effect study is necessary. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient les conséquences des théories existantes relatives au volume de titres négociés sur les études à contenu informationnel empirique. À l'aide d'un simple modèle d'équilibre général, ils analysent et illustrent comment le volume de titres négociés réagit à l'information transmise par un événement. Leur étude révèle que le volume de titres négociés par suite de la publication d'un événement informationnel croît en fonction de la dispersion dans les changements d'attitude chez les investisseurs attribuables à l'information que livre l'événement, plutôt qu'en fonction des changements d'attitude eux-mêmes. Elle démontre également qu'en raison de la possibilité qu'il n'y ait aucun changement de prix important, l'étude du comportement des prix risque de ne pas suffire à elle seule à évaluer avec précision le contenu informationnel d'un événement, et qu'une étude simultanée du comportement du volume de titres négociés s'impose.     

Crowding Out and the Informativeness of Security Prices

Individual investors trade less agressively on any particular piece of information as more investors observe it. The trades of the new investors observing a piece of information “crowd out” some of the trades of the old investors who observe that same piece of information. This paper shows that when traders are risk averse, these crowding out effects lead the proportions of traders who choose to observe one signal versus another to differ from the proportions that maximize the informativeness of prices.