Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High‐Frequency World

We describe the process through which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes filings “publicly available.” For a sample of Form 4 (insider trade) filings, we show that, during the period we examine, the majority of filings are available to paying subscribers of the SEC's public dissemination system (PDS) feed before they are posted to the EDGAR website, and so provide subscribers and their clients with a private advantage. We show that this advantage translates into an economically significant trading advantage, and prices, volumes, and spreads respond to the news contained in filings beginning around 30 seconds before public posting. These findings indicate that the SEC dissemination process does not always provide a level playing field and that the meaning of publicly available information in capital markets is no longer simple or obvious. In response to our study, the SEC launched an investigation and agreed to eliminate the PDS timing advantage.     

Human Capital,Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.     

COX REGRESSION WITH ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF WAITING TIME: THE NEW ORLEANS YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC OF 1853

Event data can often be analysed using different concepts of waiting time. Our application offers three choices: calendar-time, age, and duration of residence in New Orleans. We exploit the semi-parametric features of Cox regression and estimate parallel specifications in which mortality risk is treated as an arbitrary function of one of the three alternative time measures, while the remaining two enter the hazard parametrically. Comparisons of the parameter estimates with the corresponding estimates of the baseline hazards form the crux of a simple specification checking procedure. In our formal treatment we rely on Aalen's Multiplicative Intensity formulation and tackle complications such as left-truncation, functional form specification, and choice-based sampling. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Local Aggregate Effects of Minimum Wage Increases

Using variation in minimum wages across cities and controlling for differences in business-cycle factors and long-run local economic trends, we find that following minimum wage increases, both, prices and nominal spending rise modestly. These gains are larger for certain subcategories of goods such as food away from home and in locations where low-wage workers account for a larger share of employment. Further, minimum wage increases are associated with reduced total debt among households with low credit scores, higher auto debt, and increased access to credit.     

Strategic Complementarity,Stabilization Policy,and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study's key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications; specifically, in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.     

Are Analysts’ Recommendations Informative? Intraday Evidence on the Impact of Time Stamp Delays

We demonstrate that time stamps reported in I/B/E/S for analysts’ recommendations released during trading hours are systematically delayed. Using newswire‐reported time stamps, we find 30‐minute returns of 1.83% (?2.10%) for upgrades (downgrades), but for this subset of recommendations we find corresponding returns of ?0.07% (?0.09%) using I/B/E/S‐reported time stamps. We also examine the information content of recommendations relative to management guidance and earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that analysts’ recommendations are the most important information disclosure channel examined.     

CONSERVED ENERGY SUPPLY CURVES FOR U.S. BUILDINGS

Comparison of nine conservation supply curves for electricity shows that fully implementing a series of energy efficiency measures will result in annual saving of 734 billion kWh (BkWh). This is 45 percent of 1989 U.S. building sector electricity use of 1627 BkWh and represents a $29 billion saving. When translated to units of conserved carbon dioxide (CC CO₂), this annual saving is 514 megatonnes, which is 10 percent of the total 1989 U.S. carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from all sources. Implementing additional fuel efficiency measures would result in further potential saving of 5·2 quads of fuel (natural gas and oil) per year, or another 300 megatonnes of CO₂, at a net savings of $20 billion. Fuel switching (replacing electric resistance heat with on-site natural gas combustion) would produce annual saving of another 74 megatonnes of CO₂ at a net saving of $6·8 billion. Thus, total CO₂ saving from these combined efficiency measures are 890 megatonnes at a net saving of $56 billion per year.     

Unshrouding: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey

Lower prices produce higher demand… or do they? A bank's direct marketing to holders of “free” checking accounts shows that a large discount on 60% APR overdrafts reduces overdraft usage, especially when bundled with a discount on debit card or autodebit transactions. In contrast, messages mentioning overdraft availability without mentioning price increase usage. Neither change persists long after the messages stop. These results do not square easily with classical models of consumer choice and firm competition. Instead, they support behavioral models where consumers underestimate and are inattentive to overdraft costs, and firms respond by shrouding overdraft prices in equilibrium.     

Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives

This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure “quality” in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide higher quality disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading.