Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG

We study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company (ComROAD AG) and a large, reputable audit firm (KPMG) in a country (Germany) that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability. We use this event to study whether an auditor's reputation helps to ensure audit quality, a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support. Given the absence of a strong insurance rationale for audit quality, Germany permits a relatively clean test of whether auditor reputation matters. We find that KPMG's clients sustain negative abnormal returns of 3% at events pertaining to ComROAD, and that these returns are more negative for companies that are likely to have higher demands for audit quality. We also find an increase in the number of clients that drop KPMG in the year of the ComROAD scandal (mostly smaller, recently public companies that are similar to ComROAD). Overall, our results provide support for the reputation rationale for audit quality.     

Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings

In this paper, we examine the economic impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) by analyzing foreign listing behavior onto U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of SOX in 2002. Using a sample of all listing events onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 1995–2006, we develop an exchange choice model that captures firm‐level, industry‐level, exchange‐level, and country‐level listing incentives, and test whether these listing preferences changed following the enactment of SOX. After controlling for firm characteristics and other economic determinants of these firms' exchange choice, we find that the listing preferences of large foreign firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) Main Market did not change following the enactment of SOX. In contrast, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing among small foreign firms choosing between the NASDAQ and LSE's Alternative Investment Market decreased following the enactment of SOX. The negative effect among small firms is consistent with these marginal companies being less able to absorb the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance. The screening of smaller firms with weaker governance attributes from U.S. exchanges is consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by SOX increasing the bonding‐related benefits of a U.S. listing.     

ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF NET PRESENT VALUE AND MARKET VALUE ADDED AS MEASURES OF A PROJECT'S ECONOMIC WORTH

The metric Economic Value Added, or EVA, has recently become quite popular for analyzing company balance sheets, determining executive compensation packages and even project selection. The analysis entails comparing net after-tax operating profit against the allocated cost of capital for a given period. This paper shows, in general, that Market Value Added (MVA), which is the present value of a series of EVA values, is economically equivalent to the traditional NPV measure of worth for evaluating an after-tax cash flow profile of a project if the cost of capital is used for discounting. Additionally, insight is provided into the rationale behind EVA analysis through an interpretation of its capital and income allocation procedure for investment projects.     

Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk

This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the  difference  between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.     

RATINGS AND REVENUES: EVIDENCE FROM MOVIE RATINGS

Ratings and report cards provide a relatively cheap way to influence consumer and producer decisions. We examine the specific case of movie ratings and find that receiving a mature rating (rated R) reduces a movie's box office revenues by 20%. We focus on the specific role of ratings by constructing a mature content index for each movie and compare movies with similar amounts of mature content, but that received different ratings. We also exploit the fact that the movie rating system places specific guidelines on the number of F‐words that are allowed at each content rating. (JEL D0, L82)     

READERS’ FORUM AUTOMOBILE REPLACEMENT CASE STUDIES FOR ENGINEERING ECONOMY CLASSES

Case studies have long been used to supplement material in engineering economy courses. To develop these studies is difficult in that the amount of information provided to the student may either trivialize the project or complicate it beyond reason. However, with the wealth of information on the Worldwide Web, this task has become easier. A case study involving the replacement of automobiles is presented and classroom experiences are shared.     

Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms

Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.