CREDIT CYCLES REDUX*

Theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production technologies, collateral constraints can act as a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks. We investigate whether or not this result holds under more standard assumptions. We find that collateral constraints typically generate small output amplification. Large amplification is obtained as a “knife‐edge” type of result.     

Supplier Partnerships and the Small, High-Growth Firm: Selecting for Success

Strategic partnerships are commonplace in today's global economy. Effective use of partnerships are viewed increasingly as an important issue facing small, growth-oriented firms. A key debate is how small firms should manage supplier partnerships. Contrasting the debate about the extent to which small firms are inertial versus adaptive, the impact of growth on value chain partnerships with suppliers was investigated. Data collected from 91 pharmaceutical-related firms is used to test the proposition that firm growth is related positively to maintaining or to expanding relationships with suppliers, not to terminating partnerships. The paper further posits that this relationship between firm growth and the amount purchased from a supplier is moderated by the perceived effectiveness of the value-chain partnerships such that when effectiveness is higher, the relationship between sales growth and the amount purchased from a value-chain partner is stronger. The propositions, which are tested with regression analysis, are supported partially.     

A theoretical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies

The margin system is the first line of defense against the default risk of a clearinghouse. From the perspectives of a clearinghouse, the utmost concern is to have a prudential system to control the default exposure. Once the level of prudentiality is set, the next concern will be the opportunity cost of the investors, because high opportunity cost discourages people from hedging futures, and thus defeats the function of a futures market. In this article, we first develop different measures of prudentiality and opportunity cost. We then formulate a statistical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies, all of which strike a balance between prudentiality and opportunity cost. Three margin‐setting methodologies, namely, (1) using simple moving averages; (2) using exponentially weighted moving averages; (3) using a GARCH approach, are applied to the Hang Seng Index futures. Keeping the same prudentiality level, it is shown that the one using a GARCH approach by and large gives the lowest average overcharge. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:117–145, 2004     

The index futures markets: Is screen trading more efficient?

This article uses a nonparametric test based on the arc‐sine law (see, e.g., Feller, 1965 ), which involves comparing the theoretical distribution implied by an intraday random walk with the empirical frequency distribution of the daily high/low times, in order to address the question of whether the abandonment of pit trading has been associated with greater market efficiency. If market inefficiencies result from flaws in the market microstructure of pit trading, they ought to have been eliminated by the introduction of screen trading. If, on the other hand, the inefficiencies are a reflection of investor psychology, they are likely to have survived, unaffected by the changeover. We focus here on four cases. Both the FTSE‐100 and CAC‐40 index futures contracts were originally traded by open outcry and have moved over to electronic trading in recent years, so that we are able to compare pricing behavior before and after the changeover. The equivalent contracts in Germany and Korea, on the other hand, have been traded electronically ever since their inception. Our results overwhelmingly reject the random‐walk hypothesis both for open‐outcry and electronic‐trading data sets, suggesting there has been no increase in efficiency as a result of the introduction of screen trading. One possible explanation consistent with our results would be that the index futures market is characterized by intraday overreaction. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:337–357, 2004     

An empirical analysis of the relationship between the hedge ratio and hedging horizon: A simultaneous estimation of the short‐ and long‐run hedge ratios

This article analyzes the effects of the length of hedging horizon on the optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness using 9 different hedging horizons and 25 different commodities. We discuss the concept of short‐ and long‐run hedge ratios and propose a technique to simultaneously estimate them. The empirical results indicate that the short‐run hedge ratios are significantly less than 1 and increase with the length of hedging horizon. We also find that hedging effectiveness increases with the length of hedging horizon. However, the long‐run hedge ratio is found to be close to the naïve hedge ratio of unity. This implies that, if the hedging horizon is long, then the naïve hedge ratio is close to the optimum hedge ratio. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:359–386, 2004     

Dynamics of the federal funds target rate: a nonstationary discrete choice approach

We apply a discrete choice approach to model the empirical behaviour of the Federal Reserve in changing the federal funds target rate, the benchmark of short‐term market interest rates in the US. Our methods allow the explanatory variables to be nonstationary as well as stationary. This feature is particularly useful in the present application as many economic fundamentals that are monitored by the Fed and are believed to affect decisions to adjust interest rate targets display some nonstationarity over time. The chosen model successfully predicts the majority of the target rate changes during the time period considered (1994–2001) and helps to explain strings of similar intervention decisions by the Fed. Based on the model‐implied optimal interest rate, our findings suggest that there is a lag in the Fed's reaction to economic shocks during this period. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of the 9/11 Events on the American and French Stock Markets

Markets reacted strongly to the World Trade Center attacks both in Europe and in the United States. The extent of this crisis was difficult to assess at the time, underlining the need for a specific tool to measure the magnitude of financial crises. A first measure was recently proposed and applied to the foreign exchange market by Zumbach et al. (2000a,b ). Their measure relies on an analogy with geophysics; the related index of market shocks (IMS) that we propose here is also the counterpart of the Richter scale used for earthquakes. We apply this measure on the French and the American stock markets to put large market events into perspective. The crisis triggered by the September attacks was actually the worst since 1987, and the ninth worst when compared to major historical ones.