Hardening soft accounting information: Games for planning organizational change

This study provides theory and field evidence on the social process of hardening soft accounting information to make it persuasive for planning organizational change. Accounting information intended to support organizational change is often soft, that is, there is lack of interpersonal agreement about its quality. For example, employees can lack agreement about the quality of accounting information (e.g., activity-based costing) because the information is constructed from subjective information obtained from interviews and surveys. This information can contain unintentional errors as well as intentional distortions that are intended to avoid revealing embarrassing inefficiencies and/or to resist painful organizational change. We use concepts from applied game theory and social psychology to identify from the accounting literature four multi-person games that may be played to harden soft accounting information. These hardening games are characterized in terms of payoffs, players, the comparability of soft accounting information, and the rules of the games that are expected to emerge. We interpret the field evidence as indicating that the hardening games that emerge depend on who the players are and the comparability of their soft accounting information. In addition, we provide evidence on how the rules of the games that harden the information emerge from the players’ social interactions. Finally, we provide evidence on how an organization learns by trial-and-error how to harden soft accounting information by changing the players and the comparability of the soft accounting information.     

Purchasing power parity: Doctrinal perspective and evidence from the 1920s

The first part of the paper traces the doctrinal origins of the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine and reviews the central issues of controversy. The second part is an empirical study covering the flexible exchange rates period of the 1920s. The empirical work examines the efficiency of foreign exchange markets, the absolute and the relative versions of PPP for alternative price indices, the homogeneity postulate, the relation between the short run and the long run, and the patterns of ‘causality’ between prices and exchange rates. The paper concludes with estimations of price equations and a discussion of the proper specification of PPP.     

Job Satisfaction as a Function of Top Management Support for Ethical Behavior: A Study of Indian Managers

Based on organizational justice theories and cognitive dissonance theories, the authors hypothesized that: (a) perceived top management support for ethical behaviors will be positively correlated with all facets of job satisfaction (supervision, pay, promotion, work, co-workers, and overall); and (b) the correlation will be highest with the facet of supervision. Empirical results (n = 77 middle level managers from two organizations in South India) supported only the second hypothesis. Implications for managing a global workforce are discussed.     

On the tradeoff between wage indexation and foreign exchange intervention

Zusammenfassung Zum “trade-off” zwischen Lohnindexierung und Intervention auf dem Devisenmarkt. - In diesem Aufsatz analysieren die Verfasser die Beziehung zwischen dem optimalen MaΒ für Lohnindexierung und dem für Wechselkursinterventionen. Die optimalen Gr?Βen für diese beiden wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente werden mit Hilfe einer gemeinsamen Optimierung unter Berücksichtigung ihrer wechselseitigen Interdependenz ermittelt. Das bei der Untersuchung verwendete Modell wird gepr?gt durch die Charakteristika der stochastischen Schocks, die die Volkswirtschaft beeinflussen, und durch das Informations-bündel, das die Wirtschaftssubjekte annahmegem?Β besitzen. In der Analyse wird sowohl geprüft, wie der optimale Lohnindexierungsgrad mit dem gesamten Spektrum m?glicher Wechselkurssysteme zusammenh?ngt, als auch untersucht, wie das optimale AusmaΒ der Wechselkursinterventionen von dem gesamten Spektrum m?glicher Lohnindexierungsgrade abh?ngt. Eines der Hauptergebnisse ist, daΒ es keine monotone Beziehung zwischen den optimalen Werten der beiden wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente gibt. Worin der “trade-off” zwischen ihnen genau besteht, wird in der Untersuchung im einzelnen dargelegt.

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Résumé Le ?trade-off? entre l’indexation salariale et l’intervention en taux de change. — Dans cet article les auteurs analysent la relation entre les degrés optimum de l’indexation salariale et l’intervention en taux de change. Les valeurs optimum des deux instruments de politique sont obtenues par une ?optimisation? jointe considérant leur interdépendance mutuelle. Le modéle utilisé est déterminé par les caractéristiques des chocs stochastiques qui affectent l’économie et par les informations des individus. L’ analyse examine la dépendance du degré optimum de l’indexation salariale du spectre total des régimes possibles de taux de change et, vice-versa, la dépendance du degré optimum de l’intervention du spectre total des degrés possibles de l’indexation salariale. Un des résultats principaux est l’absence d’une relation monotone entre les valeurs optimum des deux instruments de politique. De plus, l’analyse détermine la nature précise du ?trade-off? entre eux.

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Resumen Sobre el ?trade-off? entre la indexaci?n de salarios y la intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios. - En este trabajo los autores estudian la relaci?n entre grados óptimos de indexaci?n de salarios y de intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios. Mediante una optimizaci?n simultánea, que toma en cuenta la interdependencia de estas medidas, se obtienen valores óptimos para ambos instrumentos de politica económica. El modelo utilizado incorpora las caracterfsticas de los shocks estocásticos que afectan a la economfa y el conjunto de informaciones a disposici?n de los individuos. El análisis examina la dependencia del nivel ?ptimo de indexaci?n de salarios de todo el espectro de polfticas cambiarias posibles, como también la dependencia del nivel ?ptimo de intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios de todo el espectro de grados de indexaci?n de salarios posibles. Uno de los resultados centrales es la ausencia de una relaci?n monot?nica entre los valores óptimos de ambos instrumentos; en el análisis se détermina la naturaleza exacta del ?trade-off? que existe entre ellos.

     

Does Democracy Have a Different Impact on Corruption in Africa?

The author investigates the relationship between corruption and the newer proxies of democracy for African countries. The regression results suggest that countries that are relatively more democratic are also less corrupt. Of the different aspects of democracy examined, the functioning of government and political participation are found to be significantly correlated with corruption. The estimates suggest that countries with functioning and efficient governments and healthy political competition are less corrupt. Unlike the early empirical studies, the evidence of a nonlinear relationship between corruption and the new proxies of democracy is weak, especially after controlling for other factors and correcting for the endogeneity problem. Our results suggest that ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the level of development are also important determinants of the level of corruption in Africa.     

Trading with Neighbors: Regional Stock Exchange Integration—The Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano

ABSTRACT

Who gains from the regional integration of stock exchanges? Exploring this question can identify motivators driving stock exchange integration between countries, and contribute to the wider debate whether such perceived gains are likely. This article examines the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA), currently comprised of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The plan, process, and difficulties facing MILA are examined. We conclude that investors from the region appear poised to reap the greatest rewards in the long-term, while regional brokers and investors, especially those based in Peru, have benefited most from the operation of MILA since 2011.     

The Effects of Compensation Structures and Monetary Rewards on Managers’ Decisions to Blow the Whistle

Recent research indicates that compensation structure can be used by firms to discourage their employees from whistleblowing. We extend the ethics literature by examining how compensation structures and financial rewards work together to influence managers’ decisions to blow the whistle. Results from an experiment indicate that compensation with restricted stock, relative to stock payments that lack restrictions, can enhance the likelihood that managers will blow the whistle when large rewards are available. However, restricted stock can also threaten the effectiveness of whistleblowing systems without the presence of large financial rewards for whistleblowing. Thus, the large potential rewards for whistleblowing enacted by the Dodd–Frank Act appear timely as firms are moving toward compensation agreements that include greater proportions of restricted stock.     

Pricing of Mutual Fund Services in Retirement Plans: Evidence from Open-End Equity Funds

Management fees of mutual funds are more costly to investors than is often realized. Moreover, research indicates that in many cases, the fees are not related to performance, contrary to what might be expected from an efficient market. This study uses sample data to illustrate the consequences of inefficiency to an individual investor. It then turns to an empirical examination of the determinants of the ratio of management fees to total assets (MER), investigating market concentration, fund performance, and non-performance characteristics as explanatory variables. All of these classes of variables contributed to the variation of MERs . JEL Classification G23     

The different roles of product originality and usefulness in generating word-of-mouth

This paper explores how the dimensions of new products, specifically, the originality and usefulness of the products, influence word-of-mouth (WOM). In four studies, using lab and field setups, we find that originality and usefulness have different effects on WOM. We show that consumers spread more WOM about original products, but the valence of what they say depends on the usefulness of the product. Therefore, originality enhances the effect of usefulness such that consumers spread relatively more and more positively valenced WOM about original and useful products compared to less original but equally useful products. Conversely, consumers spread more and more negatively valenced WOM about original products that are not useful compared to less original products with the same level of low usefulness. The results indicate that product originality should be managed carefully when developing and positioning new products. Although originality increases buzz, it might lead to negatively valenced WOM when the usefulness of the product is perceived to be low.