The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation

Our matching problems feature agents with endowments facing certain division rules. At any matching, the endowments of agents are reallocated between the matched pairs according to some given division rule, and this opens doors to an iterated matching problem and rematching, and to manipulation of some matching rules via segmentation. In this form of manipulation a coalition breaks off from the rest, matches within itself and rejoins the complementary coalition for a rematching at the new endowment profile. Under certain division rules this may benefit the coalition who breaks off without hurting the complementary coalition. Furthermore, both may benefit by first matching internally and then rejoining for a new match.     

欧洲单一金融市场中的最后贷款人(LLR)

本文研究在欧盟单一金融市场中有效发挥最后贷款人功能所面临的挑战.简要分析了欧盟金融业的一些特点,这些特点可能增加欧盟系统性金融风险;讨论了预防和解决金融问题的欧盟金融稳定构架的复杂性(最后贷款人的运作也包括在这个构架之中);论述了当系统性金融风波影响不止一个欧盟成员国时,如何实现最后贷款人功能.最后提出了提高现有构架效率所面临的挑战和可行的途径.     

Do Australian Trade Policies Discriminate Against Less Developed Countries?*

The view that Australian protection discriminates against the less developed countries (LDCs) is examined in this paper. It distinguishes between direct discrimination through tariff preferences and indirect discrimination through inter-commodity differences in rates of protection. The second mechanism proves to be more important. While Australian protection did not discriminate against the LDCs in 1968–49, by 1977–78 it did. This reflects changes in the commodity composition of Australia's imports from the LDC_S.     

A comparison of alternative methods of updating input-output coefficients

In recent years there has been a growing number of input-output models of economies ranging in scale from the rural to the national. While offering invaluable insights into the interaction of sectors within an economy, the input-output model suffers from the fact that its coefficient values are altered over time due particularly to technological change. Two of the prominent techniques designed to update these technical coefficients, the RAS and linear programming methods, are compared herein with regard to changes in U.S. national coefficients between 1963 and 1967. Suggestions for improvements to the latter method are outlined.     

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark     

Specification and Estimation of ELES

The Extended Linear Expenditure System b reformulated to yield private per capita net worth as the basic explanatory variable. As a by-product the model implies that the marginal propensity to consume/save out of permanent income varies with the rate of interest. In the estimation, account is taken of inconsistencies in data compiled from different sources by explicity including the savings relationship in the system. Parameter estimates based on Australian data are presented.     

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria

Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation Agents' characteristics space ( ) - A Action space of each agent (aA) - Y Y = x A - Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics - (X) Space of probability measures onX - C(X) Space of continuous functions onX - _X Family of Borel sets ofX - State space of aggregate uncertainty ( ) - x _t=1 aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game - = (₁,₂,...,_t,...) - ^{t t} (₁, ₂,..., _t) - L₁(^t,C ×A),v _t Normed space of measurable functions from ^t toC( x A) - 8o(^t,( x A)) Space of measurable functions from ^tto( x A) - X^t X^t= x _s=1 ^t X - _X ^t Borel field onX ^t - v Distribution on - v_t Marginal distribution of v on ^t - v(^t)((¦^t)) Conditional distribution on given ^t - v^t(^s)(v_t(¦^s)) Conditional distribution on ^t given ^s (wheres) - _t Periodt distributional strategy - Distributional strategy for all periods =(₁,₂,...,_t,...) - _t Transition process for agents' types - ( _t,^t,y)(P _t+1(, _t , ^t ,y)) Transition function associated with _t - u _t Utility function - V _t (, a, , ^t) Value function for each collection (, a, , ^t ) - W _t (, , ^t ) Value function given optimal action a - C() Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions - B() Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency) - E Set of equilibrium distributional strategies - x _t=1 ( ^t , (x A)) - S Expanded state space for Markov construction - (, a, ) Value function for Markov construction - P( _t ^* , _t y)(P(, _t ^* , _t , _y )) Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

金融中介及关系银行——基于广东外资企业银行融资数据的研究

本文根据外资银行和国有商业银行向在中国境内的外资企业提供的外币贷款和人民币贷款的数据 ,对金融中介及关系银行进行了实证研究。我们的主要结论有两点 :第一 ,企业与银行建立起来的金融业务关系越长久 ,那么其所获得的外币贷款利率就越低。这是对金融中介理论的支持。另外 ,外资控股、第三方担保等因素 ,也具有降低外币贷款利率的效应。第二 ,人民币贷款的利率随着外资企业与更多的银行建立和保持合作关系而降低。人民币贷款主要是由我国商业银行提供。如果商业银行间的竞争仅仅是用来作为信贷定价的主要决定因素 ,而不是用来推进金融创新 ,提供高质量的金融产品和服务 ,那么这将会损害我国商业银行的获利能力并进而影响金融系统的健康发展。     

OPPORTUNISTIC MATCHING IN THE HOUSING MARKET*

We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium steady‐state matching pattern and the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, whereas the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market.     

Income determination in market disequilibrium: The implications of spillover for the design of monetary policy

This paper specifies and analyzes a generalized disequilibrium macroeconomic model that explicitly includes the concept of spillover in nontatonnement financial and real markets. It is shown that the dynamic quantity and expenditure theories of income determination are special cases of the model which depend upon the degree of spillover from the bond to the commodity market. Simulation experiments designed to produce a vigorous monetary shock to the system clearly show that national product is very sensitive to the degree of spillover, and thus, the design of monetary policy within the context of gradual market clearing should consider the size of spillover.