The link between attractiveness of “Extrabrand” attributes and the adoption of innovations

While innovators may rush to purchase many new products, most consumers are more conservative and do not want to buy into fads but purchase only those new products that are viable. How do the majority of consumers make judgments about whether they will adopt an innovation? This article examines the evaluative aspects of adoption as a means for better understanding consumer adoption and the market factors that may influence the success of an innovation. This research introduces a conceptual model that shows how consumers’ evaluation of product category attractiveness affects the adoption decision for really new products. These consumer evaluations are based on the attributes of the product category (“extrabrand” attributes) rather than brand attributes. Results from a test of the model indicate that consumers do use extrabrand attributes to assess the attractiveness of innovative new products.     

Implications of Improved Information on Market Performance

The retail food market in Edmonton, Alberta represents an unusual market to study. The basic problem inherent in this metropolitan market area of 500,000 people, is the dominance of a single retail food chain whose food sales represent up to 65 percent of total food sales. Conventional economic theory would normally lead to the conclusion that market performance would be improved by a direct attack on the structure of the market which in turn would involve the absolution of a highly successful retail operation. However, the application of monopoly anti-trust laws was certainly not an alternative available to the research team, even if it was considered to be a feasible solution to the problem. Therefore an attempt was made by the authors to observe the impact of improved consumer market information on corporate performance. The following article documents the research and leads towards a time honored conclusion that additional market information would improve consumer welfare in a meaningful manner.     

Joint oligopsony-oligopoly in the U.S. leaf tobacco market, 1924–39

The leaf tobacco marketplace is highly organized. Prior to 1940, the few large tobacco companies controlled that organization explicitly. The question is whether this organization set oligopsonistic leaf prices or minimized production and transaction costs. A model of joint oligopsonyoligopoly shows that pricing of cigarettes and leaf tobacco was unified: oligopolistic cigarette pricing was sufficient to curtail both cigarette production and leaf purchases. The companies could just bid in the market for the leaf necessary for that cigarette production rate.Prima facie, the organization was not for oligopsony coordination. The implied econometric model of pricing fits observed behavior well.Malcolm Boyd, Dennis Carlton, John Garen, Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, An-loh Lin, Robert Miller, Stephen Spurr and the referee have given me thoughtful, perceptive and useful comments. I am pleased to acknowledge their involvement without implicating them in whatever errors remain.     

Nader's Support: Its Sources and Concerns

Do the consumer advocates, such as Nader, have a real constituency? Where do they get their support? This study, based on a nationwide sample, investigated the extent of support for Ralph Nader and his program, and its sources. Nader was found to have substantial support, a major portion of it consisting of middle-income political liberals. Those supporting Nader were found to be active complainers and supporters of other political and social causes, suggesting that support for Nader is part of a broader pattern of activisim.