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71.
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73.
James W Friedman 《Information Economics and Policy》1983,1(1):37-53
This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
74.
James R Hines Jr. 《Journal of public economics》2004,88(5):1043-1059
This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation. 相似文献
75.
76.
Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further. 相似文献
77.
The article addresses the question of whether responsibility for pollution created in the past should be retroactively applied to firms, or if the costs of cleaning up existing pollution should be financed by the public. We show that making firms liable for retrospective environmental costs can weaken the incentive to take precautions against future environmental costs. This follows since public financing of these costs can lead to greater prospective risk deterrence by allowing firms to more fully internalize the costs of future environmental risks. However, an analysis of existing public financing approaches highlights a set of dangers associated with their practical use. 相似文献
78.
James Albrecht Axel Anderson Eric Smith Susan Vroman 《International Economic Review》2007,48(2):641-664
We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium steady‐state matching pattern and the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, whereas the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market. 相似文献
79.
James BC 《Medical economics》1995,72(18):112-4, 126-8, 130
80.
Exploring the boundaries of the framing effect: The moderating roles of disparate expected values and perceived costs of judgmental errors 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Framing effects on retail store choice decisions were investigated in four experiments. Subjects preferred the store that guaranteed (a sure option) good prices (experiment 1), product availability (experiment 2), or a rebate (experiment 3) when consequences were framed in terms of gains; subjects preferred the risky option when consequences were framed in terms of losses. Consistent with fuzzy-trace theory, framing effects were reduced when the expected values of options were disparate in a direction that disfavored sure gain or probabilistic loss options (experiment 2) and when the perceived costs of committing a judgmental error were high (experiment 3). Experiment 4 shows that the moderating effects of disparate expected values and costs of judgment errors generalize to within-subject designs. 相似文献