Business model innovation in a knowledge revolution: An evolutionary theory perspective

For knowledge‐intensive industries, a need remains to increase clarity on the dynamics through which business model innovation occurs. Progress has been limited owing to complexities in these industries and to the underlying ontology of the business model concept itself. Through a conceptual methodology, our findings expose impediments to current business model theory and propose economic evolutionary theory as a useful alternative lens through which to address these limitations. This research contributes to the literature by broadening the traditional scope of the economic evolutionary view as relevant for business model innovation research and by offering a corresponding framework for future research.     

Picking a loser: Strategic surprise in a design and development game

We take a setting in which upstream players produce design ideas and downstream players select among these ideas to develop finished products. Design diversity is valuable at the upstream stage and coordination is valuable at the downstream stage. However, this outcome is not always realized. We show that an intermediary between upstream and downstream can improve on equilibrium outcomes by acting as a coordination and commitment device whose optimal policy must sometimes reward inferior ideas. We apply the model to technology standards, trend‐driven industries, political primaries, and the management of process innovation. We discuss incentives to vertically integrate.     

Early twentieth-century Japanese worker saving: precautionary behaviour before a social safety net

This paper pools data from independent household surveys of Japanese workers roughly spanning the Taishō period (1912–1926), a time before private-business or government-provided social safety nets. First, we construct estimates of permanent and transitory income and then estimate saving functions consistent with intertemporal optimization. The saving behaviour of Japanese worker households is in turn compared with that of American worker households before World War I, a time when they too lacked access to general social services. The estimated marginal propensities to save out of permanent and transitory incomes were quite similar for Japanese and American worker households, but the Japanese ones saved more at a given level of income. The economic environment facing Japanese workers, however, seemed to be no riskier than that facing American workers. We attribute instead this result primarily to the widespread postal savings banks in Japan which increased the convenience and decreased the risk of saving.     

Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

A burgeoning literature in experimental studies of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism focuses on the ability of institutions that allow the monitoring, sanctioning, and/or rewarding of others to facilitate cooperation. In this paper rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The study finds that while some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed. The study also compares behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain. The expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition. Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions.     

National Health Insurance and Technology Adoption: Evidence from Taiwan

Generous health-insurance coverage may encourage hospitals to acquire and employ more advanced medical technologies. The authors examine the effects of Taiwan's 1995 implementation of National Health Insurance on technology adoption, ownership, and use by comparing changes in adoption, ownership, and use rates by private hospitals with changes by public nonteaching and public teaching hospitals. Using random-effect panel probit and tobit models, the article finds strong empirical evidence that third-party payment increases the probability of technology adoption, ownership, and use. (JEL H4 , I )     

On the timeliness of tax reform

This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation.     

Economic Analysis for the UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Synthesis and Scenario Valuation of Changes in Ecosystem Services

We combine natural science modelling and valuation techniques to present economic analyses of a variety of land use change scenarios generated for the UK National Ecosystem Assessment. Specifically, the agricultural, greenhouse gas, recreational and urban greenspace impacts of the envisioned land use changes are valued. Particular attention is given to the incorporation of spatial variation in the natural environment and to addressing issues such as biodiversity impacts where reliable values are not available. Results show that the incorporation of ecosystem services and their values within analyses can substantially change decisions.     

Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

Property Right and Organizational Characteristics of Producer‐owned Firms and Organizational Trust

Abstract ** :  We examine how organizational characteristics of producer‐owned firms are correlated with the level of perceived trust among cooperative members, using survey data from a sample of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Our results indicate trust is correlated with property right and organizational structures previously identified in the literature as significant for cooperative performance. We find that the norm of equality and the homogeneity of member interests are key correlates of organizational trust in producer‐owned firms. We also find that some property right structures that improve organizational trust are counterproductive for member investment incentives .