Who pays the high health costs of older workers? Evidence from prostate cancer screening mandates

Between 1992 and 2009, 30 US states adopted laws mandating that health insurance plans cover screenings for prostate cancer. Because prostate cancer screenings are used almost exclusively by men over age 50, these mandates raise the cost of insuring older men relative to other groups. This article uses a triple-difference empirical strategy to take advantage of this quasi-random natural experiment in raising the cost of employing older workers. Using Integrated Public Use Microdata Series data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, I find that the increased cost of insuring older workers results in their receiving 2.8% lower hourly wages, being 2% less likely to be employed and being 0.7% less likely to have employer-sponsored health insurance.     

Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence

Monopolists set prices and if the good is unessential this may place the consumer in an uncomfortable position. But if the good is essential the consumer faces a pay-to-live or -die choice. Dictator and ultimatum games are superficially similar in that one game offers the right of refusal, while the other does not. The dictator monopoly is, however, not a game, and behaviour could be radically different in the market environment versus game environment. We recast the dictator game as a dictator monopoly experiment and find that the fairness characteristic of the game evaporates quickly as rounds progress.     

Compatibility,interoperability, and market power in upgrade markets

We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls subsequent interoperability across versions. We argue that control of compatibility and interoperability does not allow an incumbent seller to charge a price premium relative to when such control is absent and, consequently, neither is a necessary source of market power.     

The Development and Diffusion of Radical Technological Innovation: The Role of Bus Demonstration Projects in Commercializing Fuel Cell Technology

North American, European and Japanese governments have legislated to control Greenhouse Gas emissions and have promoted alternative technology as part of strategies to address climate change. Governments worldwide have sought to encourage adoption of alternative automotive technology by funding demonstrations and in-service trials. Among other initiatives the automotive industry has explored applications of a radical technological innovation—fuel cells—to power a range of vehicles from forklifts to buses. This paper examines the rationale and actions of various stakeholders to facilitate adoption of fuel cell technology in vehicles through a specific market segment—that of fuel cell buses (FCBs)—and explores the progress of FCB projects in North America, Europe and Japan. It examines the role of demonstration projects and highlights the complexity of the relationship between government and developers, and the multifarious and conflicting objectives of industry players that inhibit progress.     

Maximization,replication, and the economic rationality of positive economic science

This paper argues that gross, short-term capital mobility is excessive, but that long-term net capital mobility remains low. This combination of extremely high gross, but low net capital mobility can create great difficulties in achieving full employment. However, these difficulties fundamentally depend on the political structure and the choices made in individual nations; they do not result from technological advances, such as innovations in computers and communication. Faced with short-term capital mobility, groups and classes within nations have made political choices that hinder the ability of the nation to reach full employment. But other choices can be made.Nations can adopt political structures and rules of the game that reduce the constraints to achieving full employment.     

Learning Objectives and Testing: An Analysis of Six Principles of Economics Textbooks,Using Bloom's Taxonomy

This study applies Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives to six principles of economics textboks and the accompanying instructor's manuals to determine whether the test banks provided are likely to measure the textbooks' stated objectives. The study finds significant discrepancies between the stated objectives of most textbooks and the instruments included in the instructor's manuals to measure student achievement.     

The healthy development of economies: A strategic framework for competitiveness in the health industry

Applying a strategic decision-making perspective on the economics of business, we suggest that a competitive locality in the health industry is one that, relative to other localities, is effective in: (1) providing the healthcare that enables everyone to participate fully in the democratic development of the locality; (2) providing the healthcare that is democratically identified as a direct objective of this development; (3) contributing through the health industry to any other democratically determined objectives of the locality's development. The paper hypothesizes that strategic decision-making in organizations is an especially significant determinant of the impacts of the health industry. We conclude that: (i) a locality that suffers concentration in the power to determine the objectives of its health industry could not be strictly competitive in that industry; (ii) the first best way to achieve competitiveness in the health industry would be to democratize its strategic decision-making. What this would entail in practice is discussed in some detail.     

The Manager as a Person

Abstract Professor John Roemer has defended a future market socialist order. His model would encompass an egalitarian coupon market for the ownership of firm shares, a private sector for firms below a certain size, a system of public bank loans for the raising of capital, and an industrial policy of differential interest rates for various economic sectors. This paper argues that such a model would generate perverse incentives for firms, shareholders, public officials, and private entrepreneurs. It also argues that Roemer's contention that such a model would produce a more environmentally sensitive polity is problematic.