Integrated water and economic modelling of the impacts of water market instruments on the South African economy

A static computable general equilibrium model of South Africa is adapted to compare new taxes on water demand by two industries, namely forestry, and irrigated field crops. Comparisons are made with respect to both the short and the long run, in terms of three target variables, namely (i) the environment; (ii) the economy; and (iii) equity. Since the taxes on the two industries do not raise the same amount of revenue, the target variables are calculated per unit of real government revenue raised by the new taxes (also referred to as the marginal excess burdens of the taxes). The model results are robust for moderate values of the water elasticity of demand in the two industries, in both the long and the short run. The tax on irrigated field crops performs better in terms of all three the target variables in the short run. In the long run the tax on irrigated filed crops is better in terms of water saving, but reduces real GDP and the consumption by poor households.     

Do Immigrants Affect Firm‐Specific Wages?*

We propose and test a novel effect of immigration on wages. Existing studies have focused on the wage effects that result from changes in the aggregate labour supply in a competitive labour market. We argue that if labour markets are not fully competitive, immigrants might also affect wage formation at the most disaggregate level – the workplace. Using linked employer?employee data, we find that an increased use of low‐skilled immigrant workers has a significantly negative effect on the wages of native workers at the workplace – also when controlling for potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using both fixed effects and instrumental variables.     

Versicherungsvertragliche Anzeigepflicht und Garantiehaftung für culpa in contrahendo

To sanction the insurant’s obligation to disclose the risk-relevant circumstances by the insurer’s exemption from performance does not comply with the ordinary pattern of pre-contractual liability. Instead of making the insurant responsible for the consequences of his breach of duty, the German Insurance Act subjects him to a guarantee which is comparable to the one imposed by the German Civil Code in the case of initial impossibility. The insurant has to guarantee that the facts which he did not, or at least not entirely, disclose do not cause any obligation of the insurer. The structure of this sanction is equivalent to the insurer’s so-called liability of performance. But contrary to the latter it can be justified by the specific importance of the insurant’s pre-contractual obligation of disclosure.