Marriage traditions and investment in education: The case of bride kidnapping

The cultural practice of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan may alter the returns to education for young women in an ambiguous direction due to two competing effects. On the one hand, women facing a risk of kidnapping may reduce education investment due to uncertain returns. Alternatively, since kidnapping is less likely to occur while a woman is in school, women may increase education investment to lower their personal risk of being kidnapped into marriage. Understanding how education is affected by kidnapping risk allows us to better anticipate changes in education when the laws are enforced and the risk declines. We develop a two-period utility model to highlight the effects of kidnapping risk on education and to help identify those girls who are most likely to increase their education when faced with positive regional kidnapping risk and thus most likely to reduce education if the risk is eliminated. We test the implications of the theory empirically using the Life in Kyrgyzstan data. Difference-in-difference regression results point to a negative relationship between regional kidnapping rates and education, suggesting that the elimination of kidnapping is likely to induce higher education rates of women in Kyrgyzstan. The results are informative to the literature at the intersection of marriage traditions, women's bargaining power and education attainment.     

Corporate governance and private placement issuance in Australia

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating dilution in the economic and voting interests of existing nonparticipating (retail) shareholders in private placements. Based on a sample of 2420 private placements in Australia from 2001 to 2012, we find support for this proposition through the influence of corporate governance on pricing negotiation and firms’ choice of issuing method in private placements. Specifically, firms with better corporate governance offer private placements with a smaller discount, and are more likely to include a share purchase plan, which protects nonparticipating shareholders from ownership dilution in the placement.     

The impact of non-neutral federal regulatory policy on competition

We present a duopoly competition model to illustrate how the simultaneous incorporation of two US federal regulatory programs negatively affected telecommunications competition during the past decade. Our model shows that the simultaneous implementation of the Universal Service Fund policy that grants subsidies to incumbent telecommunications providers serving in high-cost areas, and the carrier of last resort policy that mandates incumbents to provide service in under-served geographic areas, deters competitive entry in low-cost markets and thereby runs counter to the objectives for which the policies were intended. This model provides a theoretical explanation of a failure of federal policy.