ESTIMATING CAUSAL EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL ACCESS AND USE ON A BROAD SET OF RISKY BEHAVIORS: REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY EVIDENCE

A growing body of evidence suggests large increases in criminal behavior and mortality coinciding with a young adult's 21st birthday, when alcohol consumption becomes legal. The policy implications from these findings have focused on the need to reduce drinking among young people, potentially by enforcing stricter alcohol controls. However, mortality and arrests are relatively infrequent outcomes and relatively less is known about the intermediate and more prevalent consequences of legal access to alcohol at age 21. This paper uses the Add Health data combined with a regression discontinuity approach to examine the effects of alcohol access on sexual behavior, drunk driving, violence, and other outcomes. The results suggest relatively large effects that appear concentrated in men. The sample also allows some suggestive policy implications on whether changing the minimum drinking age may reduce these consequences. (JEL I12, I18)     

Behavioral Factors in Equity Allocation Decisions: A Large-Scale Experimental Study With Context

Traditional models of rational behavior struggle to explain how individuals allocate their money over a variety of financial instruments, including annuities, the stock market, and risk-free bonds. This study uses a large and diverse data set from an investment experiment that is rich in context and captures some important features of actual financial decision making. The focus of the article is to build on the literature documenting behavioral explanations for investment choices by studying the equity allocation decision across different financial tools. The authors find evidence that risk aversion, inertia, and excessive extrapolation are associated with investment behavior even when it is clear that return rates are independent across decision-making periods. Further, subjects have an asymmetric response to positive versus negative returns. In addition to having a novel experimental design, the authors also examine behavior before and after the recent financial crisis. The authors find that the financial crisis indirectly affects the first-stage annuity take-up rate in the experiments vis-à-vis a higher average level of risk aversion after the start of the crisis.     

What you export matters

When local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, specialization patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods that a country produces may have important implications for economic growth. We demonstrate this proposition formally and adduce some empirical support for it. We construct an index of the “income level of a country’s exports,” document its properties, and show that it predicts subsequent economic growth.     

The market for preferences

Learning processes are widely held to be the mechanism by whichboundedly rational agents adapt to environmental changes. Weargue that this same outcome might also be achieved by a differentmechanism, namely specialisation and the division of knowledge,which we here extend to the consumer side of the economy. Wedistinguish between high-level preferences and low-level preferencesas nested systems of rules used to solve particular choice problems.We argue that agents, while sovereign in high-level preferences,may often find it expedient to acquire, in a pseudo-market,the low-level preferences in order to make good choices whenpurchasing complex commodities about which they have littleor no experience. A market for preferences arises when environmentalcomplexity overwhelms learning possibilities and leads agentsto make use of other people's specialised knowledge and decisionrules.     

Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment

Recent research has found significant differences in the ability of subjects tacitly to collude, depending on the nature of the strategic interaction (e.g., Cournot vs. Bertrand or substitutes vs. complements goods). We investigate the relationship between subject-specific risk tolerance and tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly experiments. We find that less risk-averse subjects price higher than do their more risk-averse counterparts, but this relationship is only significant when actions are strategic substitutes. When we analyze pair-level data, we find that non-risk averse subject pairs price significantly higher than do risk averse and mixed pairs in both the substitutes and complements treatments.     

DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE MATTER FOR CORPORATE INSURANCE HEDGING?

We test the effect of board independence on corporate purchases of property insurance. We find that board independence increases the incidence of property insurance use but does not have a significant effect on the extent of property insurance use given that a firm decides to insure its assets. These findings are consistent with the argument that: (1) more independent boards view it necessary to have property insurance to manage asset‐loss risks and (2) excessive insurance or insurance purchases induced by managerial risk aversion and/or self‐interest does not benefit shareholders and so may not be supported by independent boards.     

INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

The benefits of storage and non‐renewable resource price dynamics

Abstract Both the Theory of Storage and the Hotelling model play a prominent role in the study of non‐renewable resource prices. This paper combines these approaches by modifying the Hotelling model to allow firms to hold inventory in addition to in‐ground reserves, contributing three new results. First, inventory is more likely to be held if future demand and/or the marginal cost of extraction are uncertain. Second, the market price of the commodity is based on the Theory of Storage when inventory is held. Third, the optimal extraction of the resource is based on the Hotelling model.     

Performance of technical trading rules: evidence from the crude oil market

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the debatable success of technical trading rules, through the years, on the trending energy market of crude oil. In particular, the large universe of 7846 trading rules proposed by Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999. “Data-Snooping, Technical Trading Rule Performance, and the Bootstrap.” The Journal of Finance 54 (5): 1647–1691. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00163), divided into five families (filter rules, moving averages, support and resistance rules, channel breakouts, and on-balance volume averages), is applied to the daily prices of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures as well as the United States Oil (USO) fund, from 2006 onwards. We employ the k-familywise error rate (k-FWER) and false discovery rate (FDR) techniques proposed by Romano, J. P., and M. Wolf. (2007. “Control of Generalized Error Rates in Multiple Testing.” The Annals of Statistics 35 (4): 1378–1408. doi:10.1214/009053606000001622) and Bajgrowicz, P., and O. Scaillet. (2012. “Technical Trading Revisited: False Discoveries, Persistence Tests, and Transaction Costs.” Journal of Financial Economics 106 (3): 473–491. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.001) respectively, accounting for data snooping in order to identify significantly profitable trading strategies. Our findings explain that there is no persistent nature in rules performance, contrary to the in-sample outstanding results, although tiny profits can be achieved in some periods. Overall, our results seem to be in favor of interim market inefficiencies.