The Union Makes Us Strong? A Study of the Dynamics of Workplace Union Leadership at Two UK Manufacturing Plants

This paper draws on qualitative case study evidence to investigate the way in which union leaders involved in two workplace organizations deal with the process of managing their role within the employment relationship. In particular, the influence of their leadership style on the commitment and participation of rank-and-file members is considered. The paper highlights the dialectical relationship between local leaders and members in terms of trade union democracy and local leadership style.     

Using Industry-Sponsored Game Nights to Educate About Risk and Insurance

As educators in the field of risk management and insurance, we see know- ledge of risk management and insurance as a core business function. However, some colleagues and students see insurance as cold-call sales or companies with a lot of money that continue to raise their prices. So we have to find ways to make our public aware of the usefulness of risk management and insurance in the business world and in private life and of the opportunities that having such knowledge presents to all business majors and business people. One method that is beginning to show dramatic improvements in at least our students' perceptions of the field and the major involves industry-sponsored game nights. While not an academic endeavor nor strictly risk management education, we believe the idea provides a useful tool for opening students' eyes to the need for knowledge of risk management and insurance and of the opportunities that are available in the insurance industry and its related fields. This article discusses the history of such an event at Appalachian State Univer- sity, the current status of the North Carolina Surplus Lines Association (NCSLA) event, and the benefits of the event.     

Seven surprises for new CEOs

As a newly minted CEO, you may think you finally have the power to set strategy, the authority to make things happen, and full access to the finer points of your business. But if you expect the job to be as simple as that, you're in for an awakening. Even though you bear full responsibility for your company's well-being, you are a few steps removed from many of the factors that drive results. You have more power than anybody else in the corporation, but you need to use it with extreme caution. In their workshops for new CEOs, held at Harvard Business School in Boston, the authors have discovered that nothing--not even running a large business within the company--fully prepares a person to be the chief executive. The seven most common surprises are: You can't run the company. Giving orders is very costly. It is hard to know what is really going on. You are always sending a message. You are not the boss. Pleasing shareholders is not the goal. You are still only human. These surprises carry some important and subtle lessons. First, you must learn to manage organizational context rather than focus on daily operations. Second, you must recognize that your position does not confer the right to lead, nor does it guarantee the loyalty of the organization. Finally, you must remember that you are subject to a host of limitations, even though others might treat you as omnipotent. How well and how quickly you understand, accept, and confront the seven surprises will have a lot to do with your success or failure as a CEO.     

Implications of Economic Interdependence for Endogenous Wage Indexation Decisions

This paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices. If stochastic disturbances are common across countries, interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries. However, if disturbances are country specific, numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy. We also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises.     

UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency — A Research Note

High levels of executive pay in the USA and the UK have attracted journalistic and academic criticism to the effect that they constitute rent extraction by self‐interested executives rather than rewards for raising shareholder returns. The focus of most criticism has been on salary, severance payments and various long‐term incentives (particularly share options). However, executive bonuses have attracted little attention and have been only lightly regulated. This raises important questions. Has lighter regulation been associated with significant levels of rent extraction through bonuses, that is, a weak relation between bonus pay and shareholder returns? Have more transparent performance conditions attached to bonuses strengthened the relation, making rent extraction more difficult, or have they acted as camouflage for rent extraction, associated with higher bonus pay but lower pay‐performance responsiveness? Are measures of CEO power associated with larger bonuses? This empirical note provides the first, preliminary answers to these questions.     

Global modelling revisited

Reasons for the great impact of World Dynamics and Limits to Growth include their addressing the correct audience (the public), and the ability of systems dynamics clearly to handle and communicate information on complex and often little understood areas. Modelling projects should usually be global or national (not regional), draw heavily on mental and not just written and numerical databases, and have time horizons of perhaps 100 years. Sadly, critics of Worlds 2 and 3 have yet to come to grips with the fundamental messages presented there, although these messages are becoming increasingly vital.     

Long-term dependence in common stock returns

The efficient market, martingale model of security price movements requires that the arrival of new information be promptly arbitraged away. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an arbitraged price is that statistical dependence among prices must decrease very rapidly. If persistent statistical dependence is present, the arbitraged price changes do not follow a martingale and should have an infinite variance. Using a technique for detecting long-term dependence, called R/S analysis, 200 daily stock return series are studied; many series are characterized by long-term dependence. Thus, in the presence of long-term dependence, the martingale model does not hold. Also, the distribution of security returns is non-normal stable Paretian as opposed to Gaussian.     

Learning, Asset-Pricing Tests, and Market Efficiency

This paper studies the asset-pricing implications of parameter uncertainty. We show that, when investors must learn about expected cash flows, empirical tests can find patterns in the data that differ from those perceived by rational investors. Returns might appear predictable to an econometrician, or appear to deviate from the Capital Asset Pricing Model, but investors can neither perceive nor exploit this predictability. Returns may also appear excessively volatile even though prices react efficiently to cash-flow news. We conclude that parameter uncertainty can be important for characterizing and testing market efficiency.