Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts

In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract.     

Stable risk-sharing

We analyze the evolution of contract participation and evaluate the selection of risk-sharing contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Organizations specify rules for sharing output among producers, and so affect the extent of private investment in production. Organizations are rigid, as some details of the contract are fixed, but people are free to move around. In the presence of rigidity, equilibrium displays coordination failure because potentially efficient contracts can fail to attract participants. Methods of evolutionary stability are used to select equilibria when organizations compete for members. We identify stable contracts which survive competition against any other. Stable contracts need not be efficient, but for large groups the loss becomes small.     

China's industrial revolution: challenges for a macroeconomic agenda

China's industrialization over the past 30 years has been an epochal event. As of 2000, the industrial sector's share of GDP has grown to be about two-third of the total. The share of agricultural sector of GDP has expectedly declined from 42.2% in 1970 to 11.9% in 2000. The sector's total output however continues to grow as productivity increases. Has the service sector grown enough to support the overall growth of the Chinese economy?China has earned her recognition as a foreign investment friendly economy. Foreign direct investment with 100% foreign ownership came in plenty, supported by a robust system of profit repatriation based on earnings in convertible currencies of exports of a part of newly manufactured products in China. China imported capital and paid for it by exports. China demonstrates a clear case of the import-export led model of industrialization and economic growth, not the simple export-led growth model, as discussed by some.This paper discusses that challenges ahead of China are overwhelming. We present three issues for immediate attention, (a) Can China sustain a rate of growth of GDP at an annual rate of 10% for an indefinite period? (b) How can China address the issues of income distribution across her 31 province and also amongst the various income groups in a given industrialized province/region? (c) Can China ensure progressive augmentation of high-tech oriented productivity of her workforce by way of ensuring building up of necessary human capital?It is argued that much of this can be accomplished by developing a macroeconomic framework with monetary and fiscal policy guidelines, well specified and transparent. Can China restructure its central bank, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC)? A progressive money, banking and financial sector with ability to absorb shocks of an industrial economy must be in order. How about the fiscal policy management by the Government of China—its Ministry of Finance?Finally this paper argues that China's economic presence will help optimize the economic gains for the rest of the world. China has joined her Asian neighbors toward sponsoring Asian economic cooperation. Let the European Union paradigm be a learning model, and China has a leadership role to play in further developing Asia's continental economic regional model.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is mobile between a traded good sector and a non-traded good sector and unskilled labour is specific to another traded good sector. The capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and of globalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change of a factor endowment on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labours using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of non-tradable good. We also find that a decrease in the price of the product produced by skilled (unskilled) labour using traded good sector lowers (raises) the skilled–unskilled wage inequality.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,nontraded good and endogenous supply of skilled labour: A theoretical analysis

The paper develops a static four sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is endogenously produced by the education sector and is mobile between a traded good sector and a nontraded good sector. Capital is also perfectly mobile among the education sector, skilled labour using traded good sector and the nontraded good sector. However, land and unskilled labour are specific to another traded good sector. We analyse the effects of change in different factor endowments and reduction in tariff rate on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change in different parameters on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labour using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of nontraded final good. We also analyse the effects of changes in different parameters on the supply of skilled labour.     

The comparative performance of the iterative instrumental variables estimator using structural and predictive criteria

The purpose of this paper is to give experimental evidence on the small-sample properties of the iterative instrumental variables estimator originally proposed byLyttkens [1970], relative to the more conventional methods including ordinary least squares, limited information single equation maximum likelihood and three stage least squares.     

Low price signal default: an empirical investigation of its consequences

Low-price guarantees (LPG) signal the market position of a seller’s offer price and promise to compensate consumers in case that information is erroneous. In this research, we demonstrate that when retailers default on the information provided by an LPG, consumer perceptions of the retailer suffer, but the extent of the damage depends on the conditions associated with the default. On the basis of attribution theory, we posit that consumers may attribute default to the retailer’s opportunism but emphasize this attribution differently in various default conditions. Furthermore, we show that the restoration of consumer perceptions after a refund depends on consumers’ focus in terms of the signal itself. If they consider the protective, compensatory function of a low price signal, their post-refund outcomes are more favorable; when they focus on the informational function, these outcomes are less favorable. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Effects of low price guarantees on consumer post-purchase search intention: The moderating roles of value consciousness and penalty level

While past research has focused on pre-purchase effects of low price guarantee (LPG), the present paper examines probable post-purchase consequences of such signals. Results of an experiment indicate that in an effort to enhance value from a purchase, consumers are more likely to engage in post-purchase search for lower prices when a purchase is made under an LPG. The experiment also indicates that presence of an LPG encourages post-purchase search intention only for consumers who are highly motivated to enhance value. Furthermore, it is seen that an LPG that offers higher refund leads to higher post-purchase search intention and this effect is also stronger for consumers with high concerns for enhancing value. The paper discusses several important implications of these findings for signaling theory and LPG-related retailing strategy.     

Mixed strategy equilibria in repeated games with one-period memory

Infinitely repeated games is the pre-dominant paradigm within which economists study long-term strategic interaction. The standard framework allows players to condition their strategies on all past actions; that is, assumes that they have unbounded memory. That is clearly a convenient simplification that is at odds with reality. In this paper we restrict attention to one-period memory and characterize all totally mixed equilibria. In particular, we focus on strongly mixed equilibria. We provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a game to have such an equilibrium. We further demonstrate the exact set of payoffs that can be generated by such equilibria.     

Channel design,coordination, and performance: Future research directions

The marketing literature has made significant progress toward a better understanding of how firms can effectively design and manage their channels of distribution. However, the complexity of today’s channel systems raises additional issues that remain unaddressed. The purpose of this article is to suggest promising research directions in this domain. We suggest several possible avenues to relate multiple channel design and management to channel-system, channel-relationship, and customer-level outcomes. In particular, we see a great opportunity to integrate multichannel customer management and traditional channel design research. We argue that future research should account for cross-level effects and incorporate variables at more than one relationship level.