The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization

A variety of experimental and empirical research indicate that prosocial behavior is important for economic success. There are two sources of prosocial behavior: incentives and preferences. The latter, the willingness of individuals to “do their bit” for the group, we refer to as internalization, because we view it as something that a group can influence by appropriate investment. This implies that there is a trade-off between using incentives and internalization to encourage prosocial behavior. By examining this trade-off we shed light on the connection between social norms observed inside the laboratory and those observed outside in the field. For example, we show that a higher value of cooperation outside the laboratory may lower the use of incentives inside the laboratory even as it increases their usage outside. As an application we show that the model calibrated to experimental data makes reasonable out-of-sample quantitative forecasts.     

What influences entrepreneurship among skilled immigrants in the USA? Evidence from micro-data

Business Economics - Self-employment among immigrants is a key source for income and social assimilation with natives. Rate of self-employment is significantly higher for immigrants than for...     

Survival and the art of profit maximization

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (“bankruptcy”) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are presumed to be aware of this criterion. Survival in each interaction depends on two factors: the strategies agents adopt when they interact, and the wealth levels they bring to the game. The model is completely symmetric with the only difference between the agents of different populations being their objectives. We consider the case where there are two populations of agents in which all agents from one group have as their objective, maximizing the expected profits from each interaction, while all agents from the other attempt simply to maximize the probability of surviving (i.e., not going bankrupt in) the interaction. We show that under the equilibrium dynamics, the proportions of each group in the total population must be bounded away from zero, but the balance is in favor of the survival-probability maximizers in that their numbers as a fraction of total population must always exceed 1/2, and can be arbitrarily close to unity. On the other hand, the fraction of total wealth controlled by the expected profit maximizers must also be at least 1/2, and can asymptotically tend to unity.     

Income distribution and income dynamics in the United Kingdom

In this paper, we propose a model of income dynamics which takes account of mobility both within and between jobs. The model is a hybrid of the mover‐stayer model of income dynamics and a geometric random walk. In any period, individuals face a discrete probability of ‘moving’, in which case their income is a random drawn from a stationary recurrent distribution. Otherwise, they ‘stay’ and incomes follow a geometric random walk. The model is estimated on income transition data for the United Kingdom from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and provides a good explanation of observed non‐linearities in income dynamics. The steady‐state distribution of the model provides a good fit for the observed, cross‐sectional distribution of earnings. We also evaluate the impact of tertiary education on income transitions and on the long‐run distribution of incomes. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then all social choice functions can be implemented in strictly dominant strategies by a mechanism which does not use “integer/modulo games”. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation in the two-person case, and describe some implications of these characterization conditions.     

Evaluation and Selection of Sustainable Strategy for Green Supply Chain Management Implementation

The aim of this study is to explore the implementation of green supply chain management (GSCM) strategies and to select the best GSCM strategy using fuzzy analytical network process (ANP) methodology. The ANP helps in analyzing the interdependence and interrelations among the various determinants and dimensions of GSCM strategy selection. Fuzzy set theory is applied to avoid the vagueness and uncertainty in human preference judgement. This study uses an empirical case study of an Indian automobile organization to validate the applicability of the proposed model. The results show that the resource based strategy is in first position, having the maximum impact on each determinant. The case organization should improve the green management system with the assistance of a suitable GSCM strategy, i.e. the resource based strategy. This study may help managers to make decisions, and to analyze and standardize their environmental advantages dynamically. The robustness of the projected model is checked by conducting a sensitivity analysis. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Sovereign Debt Management and the Transformation from Keynesian to Neoliberal Monetary Governance in Britain

ABSTRACT

Private financial markets are central to the implementation of monetary governance. This necessary integration of public and private finance means the way states govern must evolve with developments in financial markets. This article examines how the rise of liability management underpinned a shift to market-based banking and transformed the operation of monetary policy in Britain. It assesses the period of reform between 1967 and 1981 and what this meant for monetary governance. Political economy literature depicts this period as a shift to depoliticised, deregulated governance with public authority giving way to market power. This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it misconstrues the problem policymakers faced. The shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary governance came in response to the change in banking practice with the rise of liability management and a parallel money market. This underpinned an explosion of credit creation that the old system of monetary policy, organised around the Base Rate and ‘primary’ discount market could not fix. As a result, the monetary authorities had to render this new financial environment governable. The period should therefore be reassessed in terms of the capacities the state attempted to construct to conduct monetary governance.     

Re-examining the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid: does political stability matter?

While past studies had conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth and development of a nation, recent studies have tried to delve deeper into the question, ‘what makes aid work?’ (see, Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson, 2013; Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Svensson, 1999). This paper tests how political stability (vis-à-vis political instability) affects the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid. Applying dynamic panel estimators, our results show that political stability affects aid’s effectiveness on domestic capital formation. The paper considers alternative measures of political stability (vis-à-vis instability), focusing on the political characteristics of a system that have the potential to make a nation stable. Political stability affects policy selection by the government positively and, thus, public resources such as foreign aid are put to the desired use. The estimated marginal impacts show that foreign aid enhances domestic investment in the presence of a stable political climate, but there is a diminishing return to aid.     

The evolution of growth intentions: Toward a cognition-based model

This research examines the relationship between growth intentions, cognitive style, and perceived competitive conditions, with a focus on whether and why intentions change over time. Drawing on qualitative data from a sample of 30 entrepreneurs over a five-year span, we find that entrepreneurs' cognitive style moderates the relationship between perceptions of the competitive environment and growth intentions. Entrepreneurs with differing cognitive styles vary in their approaches toward formulating and revising growth intentions. Relative to analytic entrepreneurs that exhibit greater stability in their intentions, holistic entrepreneurs are prone to greater variations in growth intentions. The findings have implications for future research, practice, public policy, and entrepreneurship training and development.