Rational Inefficiencies

In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.     

The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

Summary. The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands. Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999     

Performance Pay and Applicant Screening

Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of individual‐based performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negatively associated with applicant screening. We do not find a similar pattern of results for group‐based performance pay or profit‐sharing. Our findings fit the hypothesis that individual‐based performance pay induces a positive self‐sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, individual‐based performance pay can entail problems of adverse self‐sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively.     

Product Differentiation and Cost Pass‐Through

The present paper extends the existing literature on vertical price transmission and cost pass‐through by investigating the impact of product differentiation. We apply distance‐measures of product differentiation to a specific product market (yoghurt) within one country (Germany). Results from a panel‐error‐correction model for 30 products sold in 432 stores over a period of 312 weeks suggest that product differentiation explains a significant share of differences in cost pass‐through rates: more differentiated products command higher prices and are characterised by lower equilibrium cost pass‐through rates as well as more sluggish price adjustment.     

Agriculture as a provider of public goods: a case study for Norway

A valid argument for support is that subsidies are remedies for market failures. Agriculture contributes positively to public goods as food security, landscape preservation and maintenance of population in remote areas. Using a numerical model we simulate what Norwegian agriculture would look like if the only purpose of supporting agriculture was to provide such public goods. This is compared to the consequences of the Uruguay round in GATT and possible future EU membership for Norwegian agriculture. Although the GATT agreement will change agriculture in the desirable direction, the agreement puts no substantial pressure on the current agricultural policy. EU membership on the lines laid down by the accession treaty between EU and Norway prior to the referendum in 1994 would have given a stronger impetus towards the optimal solution.     

Ulrich Sarcinelli 60 Jahre

Ohne Zusammenfassung