Qualitätserwartungen,Qualitätswahrnehmungen und die Nutzung von Fernsehserien

Ziel des Beitrags ist die Beantwortung der Frage, welche Faktoren die Nutzung von Fernsehserien erkl?ren k?nnen. Kann sie im Wesentlichen auf Habitualisierung und strukturelle Rahmenbedingungen zurückgeführt werden, oder l?sst sie sich dadurch erkl?ren, dass die Erwartungen an die Qualit?t von Fernsehserien und die Wahrnehmung von Qualit?tseigenschaften der verschiedenen Serien zwischen den Rezipienten variieren? Zun?chst werden die theoretisch relevanten Faktoren für ein Modell der subjektiven Qualit?tsauswahl identifiziert und operationalisiert. Anschlie?end wird in einer empirischen Studie geprüft, ob diese Faktoren einen Einfluss auf die Nutzung der Fernsehserien haben. Die Untersuchungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die drei Elemente des theoretischen Ansatzes — Qualit?tserwartungen, Qualit?tswahrnehmungen und Qualit?tsurteile — die Seriennutzung zu einem betr?chtlichen Teil erkl?ren k?nnen. Der Vorteil dieses Ansatzes gegenüber dem Uses and Gratifications Approach besteht darin, dass die Eigenschaften des Angebots im Mittelpunkt stehen. Damit wird es m?glich, Aussagen darüber zu machen, welche wahrgenommenen Merkmale des Angebots für die Nutzungsentscheidungen der Rezipienten relevant sind.     

The long and winding roads: Perceived quality of scenic tourism routes

This study aims to understand self-drive tourists’ satisfaction with and loyalty toward scenic roads. Building on previous studies in the context of tourism destinations, satisfaction is hypothesised to be influenced by leisure and holiday motorists’ motivation for driving the routes and the provision of roadside facilities. In turn, satisfaction is assumed to increase motorists’ loyalty toward the route. The study comprises data from two scenic roads in Norway that differ with respect to landscapes formations, settlements, experiences along the routes, and travel distance. Data are analysed using structural equation modelling. Results show that roadside facilities play a crucial role in achieving overall satisfaction and loyalty among motor tourists, and that route managers should improve the quality of these and related infrastructure facilities and services. Moreover, the study indicates that it is important to take into consideration the motorists’ desire to experience attractive sceneries in order to increase overall route satisfaction. Finally, satisfaction is demonstrated to significantly increase route loyalty, although this relationship appears weaker than in conventional destination studies.     

The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency

One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output.     

The real effects of delisting: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

We study how the delisting of a firm’s stock, and the accompanying drop in liquidity, causally affects a firm’s real economic decisions. Although delisting is endogenous, we identify a causal effect by using regression discontinuity design (RDD). This technique suits the delisting problem because the probability of delisting rises discontinuously when observable variables pass known thresholds. We find that delisting results in a modest decline in investment and cash saving and an important and robust decline in employment.     

Tax avoidance versus tax evasion: on some determinants of the shadow economy

In this paper we investigate how the possibility of (legal) tax avoidance affects the extent of (illegal) tax evasion and hence the shadow economy. We formulate a theoretical microeconomic model of household behavior in which households can participate in the official and in the shadow economy. Using comparative statics, we show that the complexity of the tax system affects participation in the shadow economy negatively, i.e. a more complex tax system with more possibilities of legal tax avoidance implies, ceteris paribus, a smaller labor supply in the shadow economy. In addition, we show that a reduction in the maximum admissible number of working hours in the official economy increases the labor supply in the shadow economy.     

Post‐merger strategy and performance: evidence from the US and European banking industries

The banking industry has one of the most active markets for mergers and acquisitions. However, little is known about the type of operational strategies adopted by banking firms in the years following a deal. For a sample of bidding banks in the USA and Europe, this study compares the design and performance implications of different post‐merger strategies in both geographical regions. Using accounting data, we show that European banks pursue a cost‐cutting strategy by increasing efficiency levels vis‐à‐vis non‐merging banks and by cutting back on both labour costs and lending activities. US banks, on the other hand, raise both interest and non‐interest income in the post‐merger period.     

Industrieversicherung in der Türkei im Vergleich zu Deutschland

In conjunction with the rapidly advancing industrialization of Turkey, the segment of industrial insurance has also steadily gained in importance. People seeking cover for industrial risks situated in Turkey, however, face several rather significant constrictions. Whilst some of those may be circumvented at least partially, the Turkish situation raises the question of the need for legislative reform (possibly inspired by German law) in this area. Such would foster the development of more innovative and adequate insurance products by the Turkish insurance market.     

Energiewende: Alles eine Frage der Partizipation? Governance-Herausforderungen zwischen Zentralität und Dezentralität

The interaction of centralised and decentralised elements is not only a challenge for the technical und functional implementation of the energy transition, but also for the political and social assignment of developing adequate governance strategies for future energy systems. While “participation” is of capital importance for all governance approaches mediating centralising and decentralising trends, it is far from clear, how participation is to be realized in order to promote energy transition and avoiding pitfalls and flaws of participative decision making processes. Against the backdrop of a multi-dimensional understanding of “participation” comprising procedural, factual, legitimatory and meta-reflective functions, the paper considers the tense relations of participation and efficiency, legitimacy and professionalized expertise, thereby identifying structural challenges for participation in democratic societies. Finally, some suggestions are made, how the governance of the energy transition can be shaped in the future.     

Europäische Streitbeilegungsmechanismen bei Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen nationalen Versicherungsaufsichtsbehörden

In the course of the reconstruction of the European financial supervisory framework all level 3-committees (namely CEIOPS for the insurance sector) were re-established as fully-fledged authorities of the European Union. These authorities are granted authority to take decisions with immediate effect towards national supervisors. The European Financial Supervisory Authorities, however, form but the upper level of the European micro-prudential supervisory system. The day-to-day supervision of the financial markets will remain to be vested in the national supervisory authorities. By retaining a system, in which the financial supervision takes place primarily at the national level, one also remains to be faced with problems, where insurance undertakings or insurance groups act under the jurisdiction of several national supervisors. Disagreements between these supervisors will, thus, remain to be commonplace. In order to dissolve such disputes, the European legislator has provided for a formalised dispute resolution procedure in granting EIOPA a power to settle disagreements.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.