Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

Resolving the impasse on hospital scale economics: a new approach

The existence of scale economies in hospitals in important for both public and managerial policy, yet production and cost function studies have found conflicting evidence. More recently, more sophisticated studies have typically found scale diseconomies, which is inconsistent with the views of industry participants and observers. In the early 1980s. California deregulated both private and public health insurance (Medical), which provides a natural laboratory for examining hospital efficiency. Using Stigler's original and multivariate survivor analysis, we resolve the conflict in favour of scale economies, and reconcile the controversy. The survivorship methodology in simple to apply, and a useful tool in conjunction with statistical cost and production studies.     

THE TIMING OF SIGNALING: TO STUDY IN HIGH SCHOOL OR IN COLLEGE?*

American students study harder in college than in high school, whereas East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. This article proposes a signaling explanation. Signaling may occur over time both in high school and in college, and societies may differ in the timing of signaling. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole. A testable implication is that high ability workers in East Asia are more concentrated among a few colleges than their U.S. counterparts. This implication is confirmed by top CEO education profile data in the United States and Korea.     

Does a Nearby Murder Affect Housing Prices and Rents? The Case of Sydney

We measure the impact of murders on prices and rents of homes in Sydney. We find that housing prices fall by 3.9 per cent for homes within 0.2 miles of the murder in the year following the murder, and weaker results in the second year after a murder. We do not find any effects of murders on rents. Higher media coverage and being located closer to the murder (within 0.1 mile) have no additional effect on prices. Taken together, our findings suggest that proximity to a murder affects nearby property prices, particularly in the first year after the incident.     

Interplay between internal investment and alliance specialization in R&D and marketing

A firm's efforts to build its technological and marketing capabilities are not limited to internal investments but can be extended to include external knowledge acquisitions. We examine the interaction between a firm's specialization in R&D or marketing through its internal investments and its alliances in two different industrial contexts. Our results, based on secondary data sources such as Compustat and SDC Platinum from 1985 to 2009, show that the interaction effects of internal specialization and alliance specialization are contingent on the types of tasks (i.e., R&D and marketing) and the industrial context (i.e., high- and low-tech industries). Our findings indicate that a firm in a high-tech industry is able to achieve greater gains by complementing its internal focus on R&D with its external focus on marketing or by focusing on R&D both internally and externally. In contrast, a firm in a low-tech industry is able to achieve greater performance when R&D and marketing complement each other, without regard for how they are aligned through internal investments and alliances. The firm is also able to improve its performance by focusing on marketing both internally and externally. These findings provide new insights into the complementarity between internal investments and alliances.     

Rethinking the Role of State-owned Enterprises in China’s Rise

The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China’s ‘rise’ to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs’ role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ‘grand strategy’? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state’s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs.     

Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.     

Information Asymmetries and Risk Management in Healthcare Markets: The U.S. Affordable Care Act in Retrospect

This article critically examines the pertinent issues in ex ante and ex post moral hazard in healthcare markets, with the U.S. Affordable Care Act (ACA) as its focal point of inquiry. First, it compares the various types of information asymmetries resulting from the production, allocation, and utilization of health insurance. Second, it reviews the literature on adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk mitigation against which salient ACA reforms are analyzed. In contrasting conventional moral hazard from an alternative theory of welfare maximization, it suggests that healthcare (over)utilization cannot necessarily be considered wasteful, even if it ends up costing insurers more on a short-term basis. Costs and savings attributable to healthcare spending under the ACA will vary between the consumer, insurer, and regulator-subsidizer. Despite the ambiguities surrounding definitions of “health,” the challenge of containing inefficient moral hazard, and encouraging its desirable counterpart, lies in the tradeoffs that arise between consumer access to affordable and quality healthcare and the market competitiveness of health insurers. The new Trump administration will have to address these tradeoffs in repealing and replacing the ACA, particularly in light of escalating insurance premiums and deductibles, narrower provider networks, and technical implementation issues.     

Spatial Interaction,Spatial Multipliers and Hospital Competition

The hospital competition literature shows that estimates of the effect of local market structure (concentration) on pricing (competition) are sensitive to geographic market definition. Our spatial lag model approach effects smoothing of the explanatory variables across the discrete market boundaries, resulting in robust estimates of the impact of market structure on hospital pricing, which can be used to estimate the full effect of changes in prices inclusive of spillovers that cascade through the neighboring hospital markets. The full amount, generated by the spatial multiplier effect, is a robust estimate of the impacts of market factors on hospital competition. We contrast ordinary least squares and spatial lag estimates to demonstrate the importance of robust estimation in analysis of hospital market competition. In markets where concentration is relatively high before a proposed merger, we demonstrate that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can lead to the wrong policy conclusion while the more conservative lag estimates do not.