New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve

Lagged dependent variables typically play an important role in empirical models of inflation. Do these lags reflect backward-looking inflation expectations, or do they proxy for rational forward-looking expectations, as in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve? Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 195-222] attempt to answer this question using GMM to estimate specifications incorporating both lagged and future inflation. They report small coefficients on lagged inflation and conclude that the new-Keynesian model provides a good first approximation to inflation dynamics. We show that these tests have low power against alternative backward-looking specifications, and demonstrate that their results are also consistent with a backward-looking Phillips curve. Using an alternative approach, we find that the new-Keynesian pricing model cannot explain the importance of lagged inflation in standard inflation regressions, and find that forward-looking terms play a very limited role in explaining inflation dynamics.     

Electricity Prices and Power Derivatives: Evidence from the Nordic Power Exchange

This paper examines the importance of the regular pattern in the behavior of electricity prices, and its implications for the purposes of derivative pricing. We analyze the Nordic Power Exchange's spot, futures, and forward prices. We conclude that the seasonal systematic pattern throughout the year, in particular, is of crucial importance in explaining the shape of the futures/forward curve. Moreover, in the context of the oneand two factor models analyzed in this paper, a simple sinusoidal functionis adequate in order capture the seasonal pattern of the features and forwardcurve directly implied by the seasonal behavior of spot electricity prices.     

A COMPARABLES APPROACH TO MEASURING CASHFLOW-AT-RISK FOR NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS

Cashflow-at-Risk (C-FaR) is an attempt to create an analogue to Value at Risk (VaR) that can be used by non-financial firms to quantify various kinds of risk exposures, including interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks. There are two basic ways to attack this problem. One is from the "bottom up," which involves building a detailed model of all of a company's specific exposures. The C-Far approach presented here is a "top-down" method of comparables that looks directly at the ultimate item of interest—the companies' cashflows. The fundamental challenge facing the top-down strategy is that, for any one company, there is not enough data on its own cashflows to make precise statements about the likelihood of rare events. To get around this problem, the authors match a target company with a large set of comparable companies that are expected to have similar cashflow volatility. The comparables are chosen to be close to the target company on four dimensions: (1) market cap; (2) profitability; (3) industry risk; and (4) stock price volatility.
C-FaR can be useful to managers addressing a variety of corporate finance decisions. For example, by providing estimates of the probability of financial distress, the C-FaR method can be used in conjunction with capital structure data to help formulate debt-equity tradeoffs in a more precise, quantifiable fashion. It can also be used to evaluate a firm's overall risk management strategy, including the expected benefits of using derivatives to hedge commodity-price exposures or the purchase of insurance policies. Moreover, C-FaR may even have a use in investor relations: by disclosing the results of a comparables-based C-FaR analysis ahead of time, a company may be able to cushion earnings shocks by furnishing investors or analysts with credible, objective estimates of what is likely to happen to their cash flows under different economic scenarios.     

Who needs budgets?

Budgeting, as most corporations practice it, should be abolished. That may sound radical, but doing so would further companies' long-running efforts to transform themselves into developed networks that can nimbly adjust to market conditions. Most other building blocks are in place, but companies continue to restrict themselves by relying on inflexible budget processes and the command-and-control culture that budgeting entails. A number of companies have rejected the foregone conclusions embedded in budgets, and they've given up the self-interested wrangling over what the data indicate. In the absence of budgets, alternative goals and measures--some financial, such as cost-to-income ratios, and some nonfinancial, such as time to market-move to the foreground. Companies that have rejected budgets require employees to measure themselves against the performance of competitors and against internal peer groups. Because employees don't know whether they've succeeded until they can look back on the results of a given period, they must use every ounce of energy to ensure that they beat the competition. A key feature of many companies that have rejected budgets is the use of rolling forecasts, which are created every few months and typically cover five to eight quarters. Because the forecasts are regularly revised, they allow companies to continuously adapt to market conditions. The forecasting practices of two such companies, both based in Sweden, are examined in detail: the bank Svenska Handelsbanken and the wholesaler Ahlsell. Though the first companies to reject budgets were located in Northern Europe, organizations that have gone beyond budgeting can be found in a range of countries and industries. Their practices allow them to unleash the power of today's management tools and realize the potential of a fully decentralized organization.     

How Functional is the Eurozone? An Index of European Economic Integration Through the Single Currency

This article is a step towards empirically assessing how close the Eurozone is to becoming an ‘optimal currency area’, as originally defined by Mundell ( 1961 ). For this purpose we have compiled ten indicators, organised them in four partial indices, and summarised them in an overall indicator of ‘optimality’. The resulting picture is mixed, with zone optimality not increasing when circumstances were favourable but the trend towards integration returning after the 2008–14 crisis. The suggestion is that disintegration during the crisis, rather than being evidence of failure of the Eurozone when the going was tough, showed a self‐healing mechanism at work. However, our measurements and indices show that optimality is much further away than it was in 1999, when the euro was launched.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Pricing Residential Amenities: The Value of a View

This study provides estimates of the value of the view amenity in single-family residential real estate markets. A focus on Bellingham, Washington, a city with a variety of views, including ocean, lake, and mountain, allows for differentiation of the view amenity by both type and quality. Results from a hedonic model estimated for several recent years suggest that depending on the particular view, willingness to pay for this amenity is quite high. The highest-quality ocean views are found to increase the market price of an otherwise comparable home by almost 60%; the lowest-quality ocean views are found to add about 8%. For ocean views of all quality levels, the value of a view is found to vary inversely with distance from the water.