转移支付与地方政府支出规模膨胀——基于中国预算制度的一个实证解释

自2000年以来,为了缩小地区间差距和促进基本公共服务均等化,我国的财政转移支付规模迅速扩大。本文利用1994-2015年省级年度数据发现,地方政府获得的一般性转移支付和专项转移支付每增加1元,年度一般预算财政支出将分别增加1.61元和2.12元,远远超过本地财政收入增加所产生的影响。这也意味着财政转移支付在我国产生了较大的“粘蝇纸效应”。在2010年提前下达固定数额转移支付指标改革后,一般性转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”有所下降。使用分月数据的回归结果显示,“年底突击花钱”对专项转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”的贡献最大。本文的研究表明,转移支付引发的地方财政收入的不确定性、转移支付下拨时滞以及刚性的年度预算平衡制度是导致我国地方政府支出规模膨胀的重要原因。本文的研究结论意味着,中央应进一步规范转移支付制度、扩大提前下达转移支付指标的范围、加快转移支付的拨付进度、建立和完善跨年度预算平衡机制、积极防范转移支付的道德风险问题。地方各级政府应该加强预算执行管理,强化预算约束力。     

同济堂股权收购案例中的资产评估问题研究

资产评估是企业并购过程中的核心环节,但近年来评估中的问题仍层出不穷。本文依据资产评估行业准则和企业价值评估的要求,对同济堂股权收购案例进行了研究,对其在评估程序和收益法的使用上存在的不足进行分析与改进,并以此为基础,从资产评估行业长远发展的角度提出若干建议。     

China's economic development: does exchange rate and FDI nexus matter?

This study aims to investigate the relationship between China's exchange rate, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and economic development. We applied the bound testing approach on aggregate level data from 1981 to 2013. The results showed that the Chinese economy benefitted from a lower exchange rate over this period, and that there was a direct link between FDI inflows and economic development on an aggregate level both in the long and short run. The results of the Granger causality test identified a long‐ and short‐run association among these variables. The GMM estimations with dummies for financial crises and RMB exchange rate policy fluctuations also confirmed the growth enhancing impact of the exchange rate and FDI inflows. To promote sustainable economic development in the future, China should focus on improving the levels of domestic investment and human capital, as well as supervising the level of openness and capital controls.     

基于One-Class SVM的青鳉鱼异常行为识别方法

为了更准确地解析青鳉鱼在突发污染环境中的行为变化趋势,提出了一种基于One-Class SVM模型的青鳉鱼异常行为识别方法。以青鳉鱼的生理及行为特征作为观测指标,将采集到的暴露在不同类型和浓度特征污染物下的青鳉鱼行为强度信号作为经验数据,利用直方图统计和主成分分析（PCA）对行为强度数据进行降维,实现行为特征提取,基于One-Class SVM构建模型,并以五水合硫酸铜和三氯酚作为特征污染物进行暴露实验对算法进行验证。结果表明,One-Class SVM模型可以准确地识别正常行为和污染物暴露时发生的异常行为;对于有机污染物最快可在10 min内完成预警,重金属污染物可在1 h内完成预警,并且污染物浓度越高,模型的识别效果越好。识别方法可对水源突发性水质污染进行更有效的监测和预警,也可为水污染应急决策提供技术支撑。     

On Minimally-supported <Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>-optimal Designs for Polynomial Regression with Log-concave Weight Function

This paper studies minimally-supported D-optimal designs for polynomial regression model with logarithmically concave (log-concave) weight functions. Many commonly used weight functions in the design literature are log-concave. For example, and exp(−x ²) in Theorem 2.3.2 of Fedorov (Theory of optimal experiments, 1972) are all log-concave. We show that the determinant of information matrix of minimally-supported design is a log-concave function of ordered support points and the D-optimal design is unique. Therefore, the numerically D-optimal designs can be constructed efficiently by cyclic exchange algorithm.     

交叉销售视角下企业多元化战略风险研究

交叉销售在服务业和高科技行业的兴起,使得越来越多的企业开始从事基于交叉销售的多元化战略.这类多元化战略同时具有多元化战略的一般性特征,又带有交叉销售背景下的特殊性.本文在对多元化战略的风险及交叉销售相关研究加以逐一回顾的基础上,对基于交叉销售的多元化战略与一般性多元化战略的差异进行了比较,并对其所具有的风险进行了深入的探讨.     

信贷约束、再分配及不平等对增长的影响

当信贷对那些禀赋较少的当事人是完全可获取时,再分配对长期增长无影响.当信贷不可得时,再分配可以促进经济增长.富人与穷人之间的不平等程度越高,越容易刺激穷人掠夺富人的财富,并牺牲了总的投资与增长.恰当的再分配政策设计可以有利于禀赋少者并促进总的产出,并使社会朝着增长与和谐的方向努力.     

对于我国公平与效率关系的经济学思考

本文主要通过对我国公平与效率关系的描述及当前面临的现状的分析,运用帕累托效率的分析方法,得出公平与效率本质上具有一致性的结论,在此基础上提出公平与效率可以实现最优结合。我国目前正值“十一五”规划纲要的实施初期,大力发展和谐社会,应该在微观领域体现效率优先的原则,宏观领域公平优先的原则,来实现二者的最优结合。     

The Negligence Rule in the Presence of Judicial Corruption and Social Norms

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial corruption and incorporates it into Polinsky, A. M. (1980). Strict liability vs. negligence in a market setting. American Economic Review, 70, 363–367 framework so as to analyze the efficiency of the negligence rule. By shedding light on the role of social norms in regard to the phenomenon of judicial corruption, this analysis provides implications for policy. First, more prevalent corruption at the status quo tends to intensify the extent of the corruption itself and, as a result, the effectiveness of the government’s corruption enforcement is greatly lessened. This implies that an excessively lenient policy of corruption may result in an uncontrollable consequence; once corruption becomes rampant, it is costly to bring it down. Of great importance, in the presence of such a corruption effect, the social optimum cannot be achieved based on the negligence rule and the equivalence between the strict liability and negligence rule fails. Secondly, the attitude of the society toward a corrupt judge plays a crucial role in governing the effectiveness of an efficient wage arrangement. If the society can fully accept a corrupt judge, corruption will never be controlled even with the incentive wage scheme.