Keynes vs. the Post Keynesians on the Principle of Effective Demand *

Abstract

The American Post Keynesians – those who attach importance to the capital ‘P’ and the absence of a hyphen between ‘post’ and ‘Keynesian’– claim to be Keynes' most literal interpreters or the ‘truest’ Keynesians (Holt et al. 1998 Holt, R. P.F., Rosser, J. B. Jr. and Wray, L. R. 1998. Paul Davidson's Economics Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper no. 251. Blithewood, NY (www.levy.org) [Google Scholar]: 17). This paper compares the Post Keynesian interpretation of the Principle of Effective Demand, i.e. the D/Z-model, with Keynes' own presentation in chapter 3 of the General Theory– and finds substantial differences. A re-interpretation of the D/Z-model is offered that would bring it into line with chapter 3.     

A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand

We integrate a banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework, which then provides new insights on developments around the Global Financial Crisis. The analysis shows that growth of banking sector money supply may help explain the secular decline in long-term interest rates before the crisis. A new bank funding channel of monetary transmission clarifies why increases in central bank policy rates could not reverse this trend. Our analysis highlights the distinction between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap, and shows that bank recapitalizations can be more effective than fiscal expansions in restoring aggregate demand after a banking crisis.     

On the economics of the longevity risk transfer market

We present a model of a longevity risk transfer market with different market players (primary insurers, reinsurers, and capital market investors) and investigate how market dynamics and the market players' roles evolve with progressing market saturation. We find that reinsurers' appetite for longevity risk is the key driver in the early stage of market development. Since diversification benefits with other businesses decrease with every transaction, the reinsurance market is intrinsically antimonopolistic. With the increasing saturation of the reinsurance sector as a whole, its competitiveness shrinks leading to rising expected risk-adjusted returns for capital market investors. We show that in a saturated market, reinsurers should assume the entire longevity risk from primary insurers, diversify it within their business mix, and subsequently pass on only specific (nondiversifiable) components of the longevity risk to the capital markets. Our findings provide valuable suggestions on how to make the best use of the market's limited risk absorption capacity.