中国城市中的三种贫困类型

我们课题组在 1 999年进行了一次覆盖六省市的住户调查。本文利用这次调查数据对中国城市贫困的性质和特点进行了考察。通过综合考虑收入标准和消费标准 ,我们把中国城镇贫困分为三种类型 ,即持久性贫困、暂时性性贫困和选择性贫困。在贫困人口中 ,有一大部分是属于选择性贫困 ,即他们的收入高于贫困线而消费低于贫困线。我们对贫困户的消费函数进行了估计 ,其结果显示以下几个因素对贫困状况产生重要的影响 :修匀收入的效应 ;人们防备外部环境不确定性的心理 ;人们为将来投资而进行储蓄的行为 ;家庭对子女教育和医疗服务的特别需要。我们还对三种贫困类型进行了比较分析 ,从中发现预测的金融资产和预测的收入 ,以及教育和医疗的特殊需要都对不同类型的贫困户的消费行为起到重要的影响作用     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Cointegration, causality and export-led growth in Mexico, 1895–1992

Cointegration and Granger-causality tests show that real exports and real GDP in Mexico over 1895–1992 were cointegrated and there was a significant and positive Granger-causal relationship running from exports to economic growth.     

Institutions,quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education

This paper contributes to the literature on integovernmental competition in two ways. First, the institutional setting within which public services are delivered is analyzed with respect to the impact on the quality of services provided. Previous studies have measured competition only in terms of governmental structure, ignoring the issue of service quality and the potential for differentiating local governmental jurisdictions along quality dimensions. Second, the outcome of competition is defined in terms of service quality. Previous studies generally have measured the outcome of competition by examining the fiscal effects of fragmentation and accountability through service costs or tax revenue impacts. School districts were used to empirically test quality competition. Student academic performance was modeled as a function of control variables and the degree of competition from neighboring school districts. Academic performance in public schools was positively associated with the performance of neighboring districts, although the effect was small. These findings, however, suggest that strategies to strengthen interjurisdictional competition may be useful in enhancing public service quality.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

Ecological Transfers in Non-Human Communities Parallel Economic Markets in a General Equilibrium Ecosystem Model

Synopsis: The oft-cited analogies between ecological and economic systems are exploited to develop a many-species model of population dynamics. In economies, markets are the fundamental institutions in which the interaction of demands and supplies determine the quantities and prices of goods. However, economic markets are not appropriate for ecological communities, because markets rely on voluntary exchange, whereas plants and animals engage in involuntary transfers of biomass. A properly defined counterpart to markets based on biomass transfers permits a general equilibrium model of predator/prey and competitive interactions in a many-species community. Functional response from optimal foraging and predation risk provide the demand and supply, respectively, in the biomass transfers. Energy per unit time is scarce and predators and prey make optimum choices with respect to functional response and risk avoidance based on required energy expenditures. The energy expenditures are similar to economic prices: they determine foraging strategies and are beyond the control of the predators and prey, yet they are determined by the aggregate choices of all predators and prey and by population densities. The energies acquired from foraging are used in a new way to construct difference equations that determine the population dynamics. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

International Comparisons of Australia's Infrastructure Performance

International benchmarking has played a key role in the reform of Australia's infrastructure industries by promoting indirect or yardstick competition, in highlighting the need for further reform and building a consensus for implementing necessary changes. The international benchmarking of infrastructure performance by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) between 1991 and 1996 did much to focus attention on the need for change. The BIE examined the performance of eight infrastructure industries relative to international best practice: electricity, rail freight, telecommunications, the waterfront, road freight, coastal shipping, aviation and gas supply. Performance comparisons concentrated on indicators of price, service quality, labour productivity and capital productivity. This paper reviews and summarises the performance comparisons the BIE undertook over the last three years of its infrastructure benchmarking program. The BIE international benchmarking program provides a useful role model for other countries wanting to seriously pursue reform of their infrastructure industries.