Monopsony power and the existence of natural monopoly in energy utilities

The justification for price and entry regulation of firms hinges on whether the firms are natural monopolies, and empirical tests have been used to determine the natural monopoly status of public utilities. However, these tests are biased if the utilities possess monopsony power - a likely case. The bias is against finding natural monopoly status, which can lead to improper policies. An alternative method of testing is proposed which eliminates the bias.     

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark     

The Timing of Purchases and Aggregate Fluctuations

We study the cyclical effects of the timing of durable goods purchases in a general equilibrium model in which both durable and non-durable goods are consumed and the durable good is lumpy. At the microeconomic level, the timing of durable goods purchases supplies some insulation for non-durable consumption over the cycle. At the macroeconomic level, the timing decisions tend to amplify and propagate wealth and income shocks. Our model also allows for endogenous price determination. When the price of the durable changes due to inflexibility of workers between sectors, the effect of adverse shocks is even stronger and longer.     

Credible assignments in coordination games

This paper uses the experimental method to examine an arbiter's ability to determine the outcome of two-person coordination games. All of the arbiter's assignments in the experiments were strict equilibrium points, but some assignments violated payoff-dominance or symmetry. An assignment that corresponds to the game's outcome is a credible assignment. The experiments test the hypothesis that an assignment to a strict equilibrium is a credible assignment. Our subjects did not find the individual rationality and mutual consistency of an equilibrium assignment to be sufficient reason for implementing the assignment when doing so conflicts with payoff-dominance or symmetry.     

The contributions of W. H. Hutt

Conclusions We feel that we understand another when his points seem consistent with our prior beliefs. The great difficulty that Hutt faced was that the concepts comprising the macroeconomic superstructure, in which—by now—so many have so much invested, are difficult to integrate with an understanding of how a money-using catallaxy functions. He believed that he had to go beneath them, to some kind of foundation on which we could all agree, and then construct almost a parallel universe, a new (which he always insisted was old) conceptual structure adequate to the task.His exposition is considerably less unfamiliar to those already well acquainted with the subjectivist analysis of catallactic processes. William Hutt was driven by his understanding that the market excels at producing and equitably distributing wealth. Economists could help, or at least not get in the way, only if they understood the functioning of a monetary catallaxy. Developing and conveying that understanding was Hutt's life work, and in it there is much of value that the well-read Austrian cannot afford to miss.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the History of Economics Society meeting in Richmond, Virginia, June 1989.     

Monetary incentives and environmental concern. Effects of a differentiated garbage fee

Market-based instruments, i.e., economic incentives and disincentives, are gaining popularity in environmental policy. However, research on the effectiveness of economic incentives for regulating environmentally relevant consumer behaviour demonstrates convincingly that the implementation of this instrument is based on inadequate assumptions concerning the motivation guiding consumer behaviour. In this paper it is argued that stronger focus should be placed on studying how the regulation instrument influences the perception of the environmentally relevant activity that it was meant to regulate. The attitudes of Danish citizens towards differentiated garbage fees (implying a relatively small economic incentive) and the impact of its implementation on the attitude towards recycling are analysed. The attitude towards differentiated garbage fees is primarily determined by the perceived equity of differentiated garbage fees and its perceived effectiveness with regard to combating waste problems. The most important determinant of the attitudes towards recycling activities is the expected environmental and public benefits. However, empirical support is found for the hypothesis that the use of monetary incentives at the consumer level may re-frame the recycling issue into the sphere where private cost-benefit calculations apply. The negative effects of this re-framing can more than outweigh the positive impact of the monetary incentive on attitudes and behaviour.

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Zusammenfassung Monetäre Anreize und Umweltbewutsein. Die Wirkung differenzierter Müllgebühren. Marktkonforme Instrumente wie ökonomische Anreize oder Strafen werden in der Umweltpolitik immer populärer. Allerdings zeigen Forschungsergebnisse über die Wirksamkeit ökonomischer Anreize für die Regulierung umweltrelevanten Konsumentenverhaltens, da\ die Anwendung dieses Instrumentes auf unzweckmä\igen Annahmen über die Motivation beruht, die dem Verbraucherverhalten zugrunde liegt. In diesem Beitrag wird gefordert, da\ die Frage stärker in den Mittelpunkt gerückt werden mu\, wie das Regulierungsintrument die Wahrnehmung des umweltrelevanten Verhaltens beeinflu\t, das reguliert werden soll. Eine empirische Studie untersucht die Einstellungen dänischer Bürger gegenüber differenzierten Abfallgebühren (die einen relativ kleinen ökonomischen Anreiz bieten) und die Wirkung dieser Ma\nahme auf die Einstellung gegenüber der Wiederverwertung. Die Einstellung zu differenzierten Müllgebühren wird in erster Linie durch ihre wahrgenommene Gerechtigkeit bestimmt und durch ihre wahrgenommene Wirksamkeit gegenüber den Müllproblemen. Die wichtigsten Determinanten der Einstellung gegenüber der Müllwiederverwertung sind ihre erwarteten allgemeinen Umweltvorteile. Allerdings sprechen die Daten für die Hypothese, da\ monetäre Anreize das Thema der Müllwiederverwertung auf Verbraucherebene auf das Niveau privater Nutzen-Kosten-Kalkulationen herunterdrücken. Die negativen Effekte dieser Verschiebung könnten die positiven Wirkungen monetärer Anreize auf Einstellung und Verhalten sogar überkompensieren.

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The research reported in this paper was sponsored by grants from the Danish Environmental Protection Agency and the Danish Social Science Research Council.     

Book Reviews

W.T. Woo, B. Glassburner and Anwar Nasution, Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Long-term Growth in Indonesia, 1965–90, Comparative Economic Studies, The World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, pp. xiii + 216. Paper: $13.95.

Hal Hill (ed.), Indonesia's New Order; The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994, pp. xxxv + 364. Paper: A$29.95.

J. Thomas Lindblad (ed.), New Challenges in the Modern Economic History of Indonesia: Proceedings of the First Conference on Indonesia 's Modern Economic History, Jakarta, October 1–4, 1991, Programme of Indonesian Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, 1993, pp. viii + 306.

Thee Kian Wie, Explorations in Indonesia's Economic History, Lembaga Penerbit Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1994, pp. xv + 187.

Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992, pp. xv + 321.

Effendi Pasandaran, Agus Pakpahan, Edwin B. Oyer and Norman Uphoff (eds), Poverty Alleviation with Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development in Indonesia, Published jointly by the Center for Agro-Socioeconomic Research (CASER) (Bogor), and the Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture and Development (CIIFAD) (Ithaca), Bogor 1992, pp. vi + 233.

Eric Thorbecke and Theodore van der Pluijm, Rural Indonesia: Socio-Economic Development in a Changing Environment, IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) Studies in Rural Development no. 3, New York University Press, New York, 1993, pp. xxix + 360.

Niels Mulder, Inside Southeast Asia: Thai, Javanese and Filipino Interpretations of Everyday Life, Duang Kamol, Bangkok, 1992, pp. xiii + 178.

M.C. Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677–1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period, ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series no. 24, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, pp. xi + 425. A$29.95.

Ken Young, Islamic Peasants and the State: The 1908 Anti-Tax Rebellion in West Sumatra, Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph 40, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, pp. xviii + 361.

Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia, Translation Series, Translation of Contemporary Japanese Scholarship on Southeast Asia, vol. 3, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1993, pp. 172.     

Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments

This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernments optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile.