Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.     

U or Inverted‐U? That Is the Question

Fields ( The Economic Journal , vol. 103, 1993, pp. 1228–35) provides a forceful argument in favor of a U-shaped path for inequality during a period of high-income-sector enlargement in a dual-economy model. This paper explores the assumptions necessary to derive Fields's controversial result and demonstrates that in fact a U-shaped pattern is possible using the Atkinson index, but some bizarre assumptions about inequality aversion are required.     

The relevance of personal characteristics in health care rationing: what the Australian public thinks and why

This article examines the preferences of the general public in Australia regarding health care resource allocation. While previous studies have revealed that the public is willing to give priority to particular groups of patients based on their personal characteristics, the present article goes beyond previous efforts in attempting to explain these results. In the present study, there was strong support among respondents for giving “equal priority” to people regardless of their personal characteristics. However, respondents did reveal a preference for married patients over single, for children over adults, for carers of children and the elderly, sole breadwinners, and good community contributors. Further, they would give a lower priority to those perceived as “self-harmers”—smokers, individuals with unhealthy diets, and those who rarely exercise. Variation in the answers according to broad economic and social beliefs across seven different categories (“factors”) influenced the pattern of the public's attitudes towards rationing. The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) indicated that most of the items in our survey are associated with seven factors that explain or capture much of the variation. These relate to a patient's avoidance of self-harm behaviors (Safe Living), their Life Style (diet, exercise, etc.), their contribution to the community through caring for others (Caring), their talents (Gifted), their sexual behavior (Sexuality), their age and marital status (Family), and whether they are an Australian citizen or employed (Citizen). The strength of social preferences—e.g., how strongly respondents would “discriminate” against a recreational drug user or preference a person with a healthy diet—is related to the particular class of preferences.     

The measurement of pay discrimination between job assignments

The traditional Becker/Arrow model of taste discrimination in pay depicts majority and minority labour as perfectly substitutable, implying that all workers perform precisely the same job assignment and have the same qualifications. The model is thus only appropriate for determining whether ceteris paribus pay differences between white workers and non-white workers, for example, performing job assignment A are attributable to prejudice (‘within-assignment discrimination’). The model is inappropriate for determining whether ceteris paribus pay differences between white workers in assignment A and non-white workers in assignment B reflect prejudice (‘cross-assignment discrimination’). We extend the traditional model to allow for cross-assignment discrimination and we propose an empirical methodology for its estimation. In so doing we address two broad questions: (1) Do predictions about cross-assignment discrimination vary with the form of the production function?; and (2) How can one estimate such discrimination when there is no common measure of productivity? We address the first question by deriving a measure of cross-assignment discrimination for four different production functions—Generalized Leontief, Quadratic, CES, and Cobb-Douglas. The Generalized Leontief provides the most general results, although closed form solutions are not possible. Closed form solutions are obtainable from the other three functions, but only under restrictive assumptions. There are two main findings. First, most predictions are generally robust across functional forms. Second, cross-assignment discrimination depends upon productivity and labour supply differences between the two worker groups, labour market structure, and the interaction between relative group productivity and prejudice. We address the second question by outlining, for future exploration, a two-stage regression methodology in which a standardised (i.e. common) measure of productivity is estimated separately for each occupation. This measure is then incorporated as a right-hand-side explanatory variable in a second-stage, all-occupation regression designed to estimate cross-assignment discrimination. We discuss the proposed methodology with reference to a valuable and interesting test case: The market for professional sports players.     

Intended electoral participation in transition countries

This paper examines the determinants of intended electoral participation. We analyze attitudes to both referenda and voting in national elections. Sample survey data are obtained from the Eurobarometer survey of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical results suggest that intended electoral participation increases with age, income and education. But attitudinal variables are also important and in particular confidence in the free market economy and satisfaction with the general development of the country impact positively on intended electoral participation. Received: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, Accepted: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, JEL Classification: H26, K42 We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of CERGE-EI. We are also grateful for the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, the journal editor and R. Filer and L. Squires.     

Performance evaluation of National Football League teams

Most recent empirical analyses of production in the sports economic literature have focused on Major League Baseball. This paper extends that literature by analysing football production in the National Football League (NFL). Using the Poisson regression model, we measure the performance of NFL teams and head coaches. The measure is based on a production process where player skills are converted into games won. The evidence reveals that quality coaching is an important component in the production process. It appears that efficient coaching can account for an additional three to four victories in a given season. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of ESOP adoptions on corporate performance: are there really performance changes?

Employee Stock Ownership Programs (ESOPs) have long been promoted as a motivational tool: employees become profit‐minded owners. Latterly, however, more ESOPs are being used as part of a takeover defense: here the ESOPs main purpose is to put more company stock in friendly hands—the employees—who, like existing management, could suffer layoffs, etc. in a hostile takeover. We find that, as a group, only the takeover‐related ESOPs are associated with increased leverage (itself a takeover defense). Non‐target firms show no long‐term increase in debt‐to‐assets. We find little evidence to support the motivation hypothesis: while actual labor costs are lower for ESOP firms, after industry‐adjusting they tend to be unaffected or higher. We find that a few measures of firm financial performance [return‐on‐equity (ROE), return‐on‐assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM)] do improve significantly, but this appears to be largely a short‐term effect. Industry‐adjusted holding period returns appear to be unaffected by the ESOP; however, ESOP firms that leverage show evidence of long‐term market underperformance. We conclude that ESOPs provide, at best, only a short‐term boost to corporate performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.