Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

Coronary angiography report

Reports of coronary angiography frequently determine underwriting decisions. This report exemplifies the ideal format and content for effective clinical or insurance risk assessment.     

Casino Revenues and Retail Property Values: The Detroit Case

We analyze the effects of commercial casinos on retail property values in the Detroit urban area. Accounting for property characteristics and proximity to the casinos, casinos are found to have a significantly positive influence on retail property values. The effect is stronger within a 5-mile radius of the casinos, suggesting that casinos have a complementary, rather than substitution, effect on other businesses. This provides some of the first micro-level empirical evidence to support the “drawing power” of casinos and the impact of consumer spending on surrounding businesses. The model developed and tested in this study can be applied to other casino jurisdictions to gain further evidence on the impact of commercial casinos.     

Zur Integration heuristischer Managementstrategien in die Dynamische Finanzanalyse

Dynamic financial analysis (DFA) has become an important tool in analyzing the financial situation of insurance companies. Constant development and documentation of DFA tools has occurred during the last years. However, several questions concerning the implementation of DFA systems have not been answered in the DFA literature to date. One such important issue is the consideration of management strategies in the DFA context. The aim of this paper is to study the effects of different management strategies on a non-life insurer’s risk and return profile. Therefore, we extend the results of a recent working paper by Eling / Parnitzke / Schmeiser (2007) with two variants and test these variants numerically within a DFA simulation study.     

An exploratory study of earnings management detectability,analyst coverage and the impact of IFRS adoption: Evidence from China

Analysts serving as external monitors to managers is a topic of considerable interest in the analyst coverage literature. There are two outcomes of analyst coverage studies: curbing and stimulating earnings management. However, recent studies (such as Yu, 2008) only provide evidence supporting the curbing side. Given the fact that the data of these studies focus on developed markets and the finding of Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) that external governance mechanisms may stimulate earnings management in an opaque information environment, we conjecture whether stimulating side would be dominant in emerging markets. China offers a valuable setting for us to test the question. Using the data of China capital market from 2003 to 2009, we find that analyst coverage stimulates earnings management through above-the-line items (ALIs) where earnings management cannot be easily detected, and curbs earnings management through below-the-line items (BLIs) where earnings management can be easily detected. We also find that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China does create many new opportunities for managers’ earnings management but does not significantly improve the monitoring effect of analyst coverage. We only find that compared to those without analyst coverage, firms with analyst coverage have a lower level of earnings management through BLIs after IFRS adoption. These findings suggest that information opacity may weaken the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms and high quality accounting standards in the literal sense may not enhance the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms if it is not compatible with the market’s institutional environment. In addition, we find that firms with earnings meeting the benchmark have a lower level of earnings management, which indicates that bright-line accounting based rules used in emerging capital markets may constrain the managers’ behavior.