State takeover legislation and share values: The wealth effects of Pennsylvania's Act 36

Proponents of state antitakeover legislation argue that previous empirical tests by financial economists of the wealth effects of Pennsylvania's 1990 antitakeover law are biased. We show that the proponents are correct. In particular, firm size, event-time clustering, and non-synchronous trading effects account for the wealth decreases reported in earlier studies. We also show, however, that both proponents and critics of the Pennsylvania legislation have ignored the earliest press release about it. The wealth effect associated with this announcement is negative, large, and statistically significant. These results therefore are consistent with the hypothesis that the Pennsylvania law decreased company values and with the hypothesis that the initial market reaction is an unbiased estimate of the law's effect on firm values.     

Strategic groups as reference groups: Theory,modeling and empirical examination of industry and competitive strategy

Previous studies on strategic groups have mainly focused on their static characteristics in order to test the theory of strategic groups and intraindustry performance differences (Porter, 1979; Cool and Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990). In contrast, this study takes a longitudinal, dynamic perspective and describes the forces driving strategic group membership and structural evolution. It proposes that a strategic group acts as a reference point for group members in formulating competitive strategy. A partial adjustment model of strategic mobility is then developed which incorporates the idea of a strategic group as a reference group. It models strategic change in an industry both within and across strategic groups. The model is tested in the context of an in-depth industry analysis of the more significant firms in the insurance industry over the 1970-84 time period. The results suggest that strategic groups act as reference points for firm strategies and that predictions of future firm strategies and industry/group structures may also be successfully derived.     

Confronting chaos

While it is common to observe that our society and world are becoming increasingly complex and fast paced, most of our theories provide no bases upon which to develop appropriate strategies. The need for developing holistic strategies is becoming urgent in two related areas: major interactive technologies and morality. Jonathan King is Associate Professor of Management at the College of Business at Oregon State University. He received his B.A. in philosophy from Antioch College (1965) and his M.B.A. in Finance (1975) and Ph.D. in Business, Government and Society (1980) from the University of Washington. His primary research interests are in the areas of moral philosophy and General Systems Theory. His most important publications are The Three Faces of Thinking, Journal of Higher Education (1986) and Prisoner's Paradoxes, Journal of Business Ethics (1988).     

Ethical encounters of the second kind

When our society holds widely shared norms and values, we can agree on what constitutes unethical business practices. To the extent our social consensus is unraveling, agreement becomes increasingly problematic. Unfortunately, mainstream Western moral philosophy offers no guidance in this situation. We must therefore begin to focus on the types of social relationships that must exist for there to be agreement on what is right, good and just. This line of argument is, at best, merely suggested in discussions and articles on business ethics. Jonathan B. King is Associate Professor of Managment at the College of Business at Oregon State University. He received his B.A. in philosophy from Antioch College (1965); subsequently served for eight years as an officer in the United States Navy; received his M.B.A. (1975) and Ph.D. (1980) in Business, Government and Society from the University of Washington. His primary research interests are in the areas of epistemology and moral philosophy — e.g., the contribution of the liberal arts to interpretive thought, the sociology of moral knowledge, and the organizational distortion of information. His most important publications are: Teaching Business Ethics, Exchange1984 and A Case for the Humanities Perspective, Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal1984     

When haste makes sense: Cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs

This paper presents an analytical approach to the tactical question: ‘What level of enforcement over time allows one to eliminate a street market for illicit drugs while expanding the least possible total effort?’ The analysis is done in the context of Caulkins' model [6] which predicts the rate of change of dealers as a function of enforcement level and several market parameters. Our analysis suggests that the simple strategy of using the maximum available enforcement intensity until the market has been eliminated minimizes the total enforcement effort required.     

Entrepreneurs and the Process of Obtaining Resources

This paper examines the process of how entrepreneurs assemble resources. In the model, the entrepreneur's challenge is to convince two complementary resource providers to commit their resources to a new venture. Before committing their resources, one of them needs to perform a costly evaluation. The entrepreneur has a problem with getting sufficient attention, because each provider has an incentive to wait and free-ride on the other's evaluation. For some parameters the entrepreneur solicits both partners with equal intensity ("knocking on every door"); for others, the entrepreneur always solicits the same partner ("pestering"). For many but not all parameter ranges, the process of assembling resources takes too much time relative to what is socially efficient. The model thus explores what factors facilitate or hinder the creation of new firms.     

Optimal pest control in agriculture

Based on economic methodology we model an ecosystem with two species in predator–prey relationship: mice feed on grain and grain feeds on a resource. With optimizing behavior of individual organisms a short-run ecosystem equilibrium is defined and characterized that depends on the farmer's use of fertilizer and pesticide and on the mice population which, in turn, is affected by pesticides. In that way, a microfounded agricultural production function is derived. Linking a sequence of short-run ecosystem equilibria yields the growth function of the mice population which is thus derived rather than assumed. In each period the farmer harvests all grain in excess of some given amount of seed. If she maximizes her present-value profits, optimal farming is characterized by either using no pesticide or a moderate amount of pesticide or by applying a chattering control. Pest eradication is never optimal. On the other hand, if the farmer takes into account steady-state mice populations only, it may be optimal to eradicate mice or to use no or a moderate amount of pesticide depending on prices as well as on the shape of the grain production function which is determined by microparameters of grain reproduction.