The Innovative Behavior of Spanish Enterprises and Its Impact on Salaries

Our aim was to analyze the effects of firms' innovative behavior on their employees' salaries in the Spanish manufacturing industry. We found a premium in the wage paid by innovative firms, regardless of size. However, when taking company size into account, we found that the effect of innovations was greater in small-medium enterprises (SME), contrary to what was expected. The inferences of the models estimated suggest that the higher the market concentration the weaker the appropriability regime, especially for SMEs. However, at the same time, a firm's innovations reduce the impact of market concentration on wages, making innovating firms more autonomous than non-innovating ones. Even more, to be able to innovate, firms have to isolate their employees' salaries from the product market. These results hold regardless of firm's size, but have a greater impact on the small-medium group of firms. Finally, our analysis backs the assumption that salaries in both large and small-medium firms are generated by two distinct economic regimes, supporting the proposition that an SME is not simply a scaled-down large firm.     

Accounting records of large rural estates and the dynamics of agriculture in Catalonia (Spain), 1850-1950

In this article the agrarian accounts generated by the large rural estates of Catalonia (Spain) during the period between 1850 and 1950 are studied with a twofold objective. First of all, their formal characteristics and content are described and it is argued that the traits and variations observed are a consequence and reflection of the social conditions under which they were generated. Second, we evaluate the use which Catalan rural historiography has made recently of these documents in order to reconstruct the functioning and evolution of contemporary agriculture.     

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence of play (the period-by-period behavior as well as the long-run frequency) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot stage game, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random experimentation some recall, or memory, is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.     

Spontaneous duodenal fistula due to hepatic hydatid cyst

Connunication of a hepatic hydatid cyst to the duodenum appears to be extremely rare. This is the first case described in the imaging literature of hepatic echinococcosis fistulized to the duodenum studied by computed tomography.     

Top management: the missing stakeholder in the HRM literature

Abstract

Despite the significant influence that top management exerts on different aspects of people management, it remains the missing stakeholder in the HRM literature. In this paper, we take stock of previous research, and conclude that it is scarce and lacks consolidation. On the basis of our findings, but also thinking in terms of what is still missing, we develop a conceptual framework that may guide further research, advocating for the need to consider co-evolutionary approaches in an attempt to integrate selection and adaptation perspectives, as well as multi-level and multi-actor factors. Future work should systematically address and distinguish top management characteristics from top management agency and link these more clearly to a diversity of HRM dimensions. By doing so, scholars will help to firmly incorporate the role of top management in the research agenda of HRM and pursue different avenues that can be scientifically sound as well as practically relevant.     

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.