Codes of Conduct in Subcontracting Networks: A Labour Law Perspective

In the past ten years, many European companies organised into subcontracting networks have decided to adopt codes of conduct to regulate labour relations and to ensure the respect of fundamental social rights. This paper first determines the context and the issues to be addressed by codes of conduct within networks of companies, and second analyses the terms under which they can be implemented. The paper argues that codes of conduct can complement the standards developed by States, the European Union or the social partners, but that steps should be taken in order to avoid that these texts replace the existing labour law.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS

This paper proposes a model of audit fee determination based upon size and other characteristics of the auditee and the auditor, and upon whether there has been a recent change of auditor (which might lead to a low-balling effect). A novel feature of the model is that auditee size is measured in two dimensions, sales and assets, and is allowed to have a quadratic relationship with audit fee. The model was estimated for a sample of large listed UK companies for the years 1981 to 1988. The results support the low-balling hypothesis and also provide insights into the distinctive role of the Big 8 firms in the audit market.     

Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation

Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e., can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.     

A note on odds in the cattle futures market

This paper investigates the odds of generating a 100-fold return in the cattle futures market. We employ cattle futures data for the period October 11, 1978, through July 31, 1979, to compute the probability of obtaining such a return. The tests are constructed to give the investor the benefit of the doubt whenever doubt exists. The most conservative finding is that the probability is one in approximately thirty-one trillion. Assuming that the return is made in the most efficient way possible, this probability falls to approximately 1.5×10⁻¹⁶.     

Sunspot fluctuations in dynamics with predetermined variables

Summary. In this paper, I study the existence of Sunspot Equilibria in a general framework whose dynamics allow for the presence of predetermined variables in the system. The main motivation for this research comes from the fact that previous studies did not allow for such predetermined variables which, nevertheless, appear quite naturally in economic models. I show, for a non-negligible subset of dynamics with predetermined variables verifying usual assumptions, the existence of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria fluctuating between an arbitrary finite number of states arbitrarily close to a steady state. Received: March 1, 1995; revised version September 18, 1996     

Market efficiency and cointegration: Some evidence in Pacific-Basin black exchange markets

This paper investigates the efficiency of the black exchange markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The study applies unit root and cointegration tests to examine black exchange market efficiency of Pacific-Basin countries. The generating process of black exchange rates appears to be a random walk. This is consistent with Gupta (1981) and other foreign exchange rate unit root test studies. Johansen cointegration tests are performed for these black exchange markets together with Japan and Singapore. The results suggest that there is at least one unit root among the black market exchange rates. Hence, black exchange markets are not collectively efficient.