TARIFF FORMATION IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODEL*

The theory of endogenous trade policy formation argues that tariffs emerge from the political process. This occurs because of conflicting economic interests trying to redistribute income in their favor through the adoption of suitable trade policies. Mayer and Riezman (1987) questioned this view arguing that if individuals differ only in factor ownership they would always prefer some tax/subsidy policy to tariffs. Here we allow individuals to differ not only with respect to factor ownership, but also with respect to consumption preferences and income tax treatment. We show that tariffs might be the social decision even though nobody's individual preferences suggest tariffs as the best choice.     

INTERORGANIZATIONAL TIME‐BASED POSTPONEMENT IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN

This paper presents the results of empirical research on the use of time‐based postponement in a supply chain context using data collected from two manufacturers, a distributor, and a retailer. The analysis shows that implementing postponement at the firm level can result in the supply chain carrying more inventory. In order to achieve its full potential, postponement needs to be implemented across organizations in the supply chain.     

WHO GETS FORMAL HOUSING FINANCE IN JORDAN?

The role of housing finance in actualizing housing demand is widely appreciated. Many developing nations have established special institutions in an attempt to assure that adequate volumes of financing are made available. Jordan offers an especially interesting case because the Jordan Housing Bank has the resources to serve almost any number of applicants at highly competitive rates. In addition, several other formal lenders make mortgage loans as do some government programs. This paper analyzes the determinants of the likelihood of recent home purchasers actually obtaining a loan from a formal finance institution. We find that purchasers in rural areas are much less likely to obtain such loans. In urban areas, the probability of using formal finance rises steadily with income. Also in urban areas, a household that purchases a unit that is an addition to an existing structure is much more likely to obtain formal financing than an otherwise similar household.     

How Do Squatters Deal with the State? Legalization and Anomalous Institutionalization in Madrid

Radical and autonomous urban movements like the European squatters' movement tend to resist integration into the institutions of the state, although particular legal and political conditions in each country or city may significantly alter this tendency. In this article, I examine the controversial issue of ‘institutionalization’ among squatters, focusing on the few cases of legalized squats (social centres) in the city of Madrid. Negotiations with the state authorities and processes of legalization are the major forms of institutionalization involving squatters. However, an anomalous kind of institutionalization also emerges once squats, whether legalized or not, become consolidated and socially accepted. For squatting to have a successful impact, then, depends on both the type of autonomy achieved by squatters and the different outcomes of the processes of institutionalization. The case of Madrid provides empirical evidence that: (1) negotiations with state authorities were very frequent among squatters, but most were defensive; (2) the few cases of legalization were due to specific conditions such as the urban centrality of the squats, single‐issue identities, social network solidarity, favourable media coverage, formal organizations working as facilitators and the squatters' leadership of the process. Furthermore, legalized squats in Madrid preserved a high degree of autonomy, self‐management and ties to other radical social movements. In conclusion, both the legalized squats and the squatters' movement in Madrid as a whole, avoided ‘terminal institutionalization’ and, instead, gave shape to a ‘flexible’ one.