Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions on vertical financial ownership and contracting: electronic integration as an organizational form choice

This paper provides an organizational economics foundation to guide managers in matching the comparatively more efficient organizational mode with transactional characteristics such as: (1) the degree of (human capital) asset specificity involved in the transaction, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and (3) the number of trading partners (suppliers and buyers) in the vertical supply chain. The key role of technology, and more specifically the e‐business infrastructure and its effects on organizational mode choice, is highlighted. The main results from this analysis suggest that changes in information technology are changing the nature of transaction costs leading to more efficient management through an electronic integration solution thus favoring contracting and outsourcing than would have been technologically possible when Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York, 1975) was published. It is emphasized that the transaction cost economics principles are durable but that the breathless advances in information technology, especially in the past decade, have comparatively favored lower transaction costs of markets over hierarchies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fiscal forecasting performance in an emerging economy: An empirical assessment of Brazil

This study makes use of Brazilian data to analyze government budget balance forecast errors. Besides the analysis of the quality and efficiency of budget balance forecasts, economic, political, and institutional and governance dimensions are explored. The findings show that the data forecasts have low quality and efficiency. Furthermore, it is observed that the budget forecast error is subject to a backward-looking effect, a bias in the economic growth forecasts, as well as cyclical fluctuations. Finally, electoral cycles represent a source of overestimated forecasts, and strong institutions and governance supported by the public are able to suppress opportunistic motivations in budget forecasts.     

Context matters: Diversity's short‐ and long‐term effects in fortune's “best companies to work for”

Research summary: Previous research has examined the racial diversity‐productivity relationship in corporations with an evident high commitment to minority programs, Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities.” To assess generalizability, we replicate this research using a different context of high organizational‐employee value congruence, Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” We are not able to find evidence for the curvilinear relationships previously found, but do uncover a linear negative relationship between racial diversity and short‐run performance. Managerial summary: Using Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities,” previous research found that racial diversity affected both firm productivity and Tobin's q. To see if we could find these results in a different group of firms, we replicate this research using a sample drawn from Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” The former sample is distinguished by high commitment to minority programs, while the one used here stresses high congruence of values between the organization and all its employees. We are unable to replicate the relationships previously found, however, but do find that increasing racial diversity had a negative effect on firm productivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rationale behind IPO Underpricing: Evidence from Asian REIT IPOs

This article examines the rationale behind IPO underpricing using a sample of REIT IPOs in Asia. Although the IPOs registered an average initial return of 3.08%, the issuers were able to sell the IPO shares above their fundamental values by timing the listings in periods when existing REIT stocks are traded at a premium to their net asset values (NAV). An IPO could therefore be underpriced and yet produce a net gain for the issuer. The issuers’ net gain from IPO is, however, negatively related to long‐run performance of REIT IPOs.     

Contracting Productivity Growth

This paper analyses the interactions between growth and the contracting environment in production. With incompleteness in contracting, viable production relationships between firms and workers, and therefore the profitability of industries, depend on the rates of innovation and growth. The speed at which new innovations arrive in turn depends on the profitability of production, for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous growth literature. We show that these interactions can have important implications which are consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environments. In particular, we demonstrate that a technological shock (increasing productivity of research) can, through this interaction, lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labour market contracts away from firms providing implicit guarantees of lifetime employment and towards shorter-term "contractor" type arrangements. We show the consistency of an increase in the proportion of the labour force under short-term employment, increased relative returns of workers in high-productivity sectors, and increased income inequality, with a productivity slowdown of finite duration.