Investment and Uncertainty in the G7

Empirical work on uncertainty and investment generally focuses on one country or one indicator of uncertainty. We extend the literature by assessing the impact of a comprehensive range of potential sources of uncertainty on aggregate business investment across the G7 using Pooled Mean Group Estimation (PMGE) and GARCH methods to model uncertainty. A significant negative long-run effect from exchange rate volatility is found for the G7 and in poolable subgroups including all four larger EU countries. Volatility of long-term interest rates has additionally influenced investment in recent years. For most estimates, a one standard deviation rise in conditional volatility leads to a 2–4 per cent fall in investment although some samples give greater declines. The results suggest inter alia that EMU is beneficial to aggregate investment. JEL no. E22, F31     

The nonatomic assignment model

Summary We formulate a model with a continuum of individuals to be assigned to a continuum of different positions which is an extension of the finite housing market version due to Shapley and Shubik. We show that optimal solutions to such a model exist and have properties similar to those established for finite models, namely, an equivalence among the following: (i) optimal solutions to the linear programming problem (and its dual) associated with the assignment model; (ii) the core of the associated market game; (iii) the Walrasian equilibria of the associated market economy.     

Construction of an economic index to measure the causes of economic insecurity

This paper is an updated study on the causes of economic insecurity in the United States. The authors have constructed an aggregate composite index that measures objectively the major causes of economic insecurity (CEI) in the United States. The CEI index consists of 11 variables that can cause economic insecurity. The time period under investigation is 1960 through 2001. A rising CEI index indicates that the causes of economic insecurity in the United States have increased in relative importance, which results in an increase in economic insecurity. Conversely, a falling CEI index indicates that the causes of economic insecurity have declined in relative importance, which results in a reduction of economic insecurity. However, despite substantial economic growth in the American economy from 1960 through 2001, the CEI index overall showed little improvement. The major conclusion is that the CEI index was 9 percent higher in 2001 than it was in 1960. This result was due largely to the increase in divorce, violent crime, rising out-of-pocket expenditures for health care, inflation, and unemployment. The results for subperiods are dramatically different, and we think more interesting, than the overall results. During the 1960s, there was a small decline in the CEI index. The 1970s showed a dramatic increase in the CEI index, which reflected both high unemployment rates and inflation rates during this period. The 1980s experienced fluctuating levels in the index but little overall change, and the 1990s experienced a sharp decline in the CEI index due largely to a robust economy. The CEI index has increased more recently, which reflects largely the recent 2001 business recession. The correlation coefficient of the CEI index with the University of Michigan's well-known Index of Consumer Sentiment is ?676. This figure shows that as the CEI index rises, consumer sentiment about the American economy becomes pessimistic and negative.     

Openness, centralized wage bargaining, and inflation

This paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase at low degrees of wage centralization but then, as wage centralization increases, results in an inflation drop-off; (2) a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank independence; and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the period 1970–1999 provides generally robust empirical support for all three of these predictions.     

The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe

Eastern enlargement of the EU is a central pillar in Europe's post-Cold War architecture. Keeping the eastern countries out seriously endangers their economic transition, and economic failure in the east could threaten peace and prosperity in western Europe. The perceived economic costs and benefits will dictate the enlargement's timing. There are four parts to the calculus – the costs and the benefits in the east and in the west. Here we break new ground in estimating the economic benefits of enlargement for east and west using simulations in a global applied general equilibrium model. Our analysis includes a scenario in which joining the EU significantly reduces the risk premium on investment in the east – with resulting huge benefits to the new entrants. We also review the existing literature on the EU budget costs and arrive at a surprisingly well-determined 'consensus' estimate, which we support with a new political economy analysis of the budget. The bottom line is unambiguous and strongly positive: enlargement is a very good deal for both the EU incumbents and the new members.     

Elasticities of rate schedule parameters

The rate schedules for services provided by regulated industries are often not defined in terms of simple per-unit charges but as multipart tariffs. For example, in the case of block price rates, the rate parameters are the definition of the block limits and the per-unit charges in each block. The analysis of these rates is complicated by the fact that most econometric models provide only per-unit or marginal-cost-based elasticities. This paper presents a technique for determining the rate schedule elasticities from elasticities for functions of the rate schedule parameters such as per-unit price elasticities. Also presented are methods for determining elasticities for combinations of service characteristics and the price schedule parameter elasticities for an entire service market. Examples are given for block water rates and Hopkinson and time-of-day electricity rates.     

Parametric and Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of Willingness-to-Pay in the Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation Framework

Standard procedures for extractingwillingness-to-pay (WTP) from dichotomouschoice CV questionnaires rely heavily uponparametric assumptions regarding thedistribution and form of WTP in the sampledpopulation. However, theory provides littleguidance regarding which parametricspecification to use and the resulting WTPestimates can be sensitive to the selectionsmade. Here we compare and contrast severalparametric and semi-nonparametric estimatorsthat have been proposed in the literature,examining the sensitivity of the resulting WTPestimates to the underlying distribution ofpreferences and the estimation procedureemployed.     

Policymakers’ Coalitions and Stabilization Policies in the EMU

A highly integrated area like the EMU features a large amount of interactions between the participating countries. In this context the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies are a crucial issue. This paper focuses on how coalitions among policymakers are formed and discusses their effects on the stabilization of output and price. We emphasize the role played by the institutional design of cooperation forums (as, e.g., the ECOFIN). If the coalition formation game is played without communication among the policymakers, full cooperation is an unlikely outcome. On the other hand, if policymakers can communicate, full cooperation becomes a possible equilibrium, while the complete non-cooperative solution is, in general, not a stable equilibrium. This supports the view that institutions for discussions can play a crucial role in achieving international cooperation even when these institutions are not endowed with enforcement powers.revised version received August 1, 2003     

Selecting subsidy strategies for housing allowance programs

The market effects of alternative housing payment formulas are analyzed and compared for a metropolitan housing market using measures of efficiency and distributional equity. The effects of “earmarking” allowance payments are considered. Estimated market effects are based on a model of housing market behavior over a 10-year period. The results differ significantly from what one might anticipate based on demand analyses of individual behavior. “Housing gap” formulas perform better than percent-of-rent formulas. Certain characteristics of the housing market together with particular income redistribution effects of the allowances appear to explain the market behavior.     

Bootstrapping Confidence Intervals for Linear Programming Efficiency Scores: With an Illustration Using Italian Banking Data

This article suggests a method for introducing a stochastic element into Farrell measures of technical efficiency as calculated via linear programming techniques. Specifically, a bootstrap of the original efficiency scores is performed to derive confidence intervals and a measure of bias for the scores. The bootstrap generates these measures of statistical precision for the nonstochastic efficiency measures by using computational power to derive empirical distributions for the efficiency measures.