Asymmetric-information and principal-agent problems as sources of value in FSLIC-Assisted acquisitions of insolvent thrifts

This study uses a two-factor market-model to estimate excess returns around 43 announcements of FSLIC-assisted thrift mergers and 66 announcements of unassisted thrift mergers. These estimated excess returns are then used to test hypotheses about asymetric-information and principal-agent problem in the thrift resolution process as sources of value in these mergers. The results show that acquirers in assisted transactions earned positive and statistically significant excess returns of approximately 2 percent, whereas acquirers in unassisted transactions earned excess returns that are not significantly different from zero; however, the excess returns in the assisted mergers are quantitatively small. For the 43 assisted mergers, estimated excess returns imply aggregate wealth transfers of only $13 million as compared with $2.3 billion in FSLIC assistance that were granted in these transactions. These findings suggest that the FSLIC-assisted transactions were reasonably well structured and that the assistance granted did not result in large wealth transfers to acquirers of insolvent institutions. Finally, the study provides evidence that informational asymmetries and principal-agent problems in the thrift resolution process were significant sources of excess returns for the acquirers receiving FSLIC assistance.The views reflected in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent policies of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Housing Finance Board. Helpful comments were recieved from participants in the Finance Workshop at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, George Benston, Richard Brown, Jennifer Conrad, Sally Davies, Mark Flannery, Edward Kane, David Ravenscraft, and Lawrence J. White.     

Life-insurance Efficiency in China： A Comparison of Foreign and Domestic Firms

The Chinese life-insurance industry has experienced major structural changes in recent years, primarily because of increasing demand and the entry of foreign insurers. Although the market is clearly booming, the efficiency of its growth and development is unclear. In this paper, we evaluate the efficiency of life insurers operating in China and compare foreign firms with domestic firms. We find that foreign insurers have not brought efficiency into the Chinese market, and that the market is still dominated by domestic giants. However, the gap between foreign insurers and domestic insurers is narrowing. After testing hypotheses regarding scale economy, technical progress andpotential improvements, we discuss several issues＇ of importance to life insurers, market investors and government regulators.     

Commodity money inflation: theory and evidence from France in 1350–1436

This paper presents a theory of inflation in commodity money and supports it by evidence from inflationary episodes in France during the 14th and 15th centuries. The paper shows that commodity money can be inflated similarly to fiat money through repeated debasements, which act like devaluations. Furthermore, as with fiat money, demand for commodity money falls with inflation. However, at high rates of inflation demand for commodity money becomes insensitive to inflation, since commodity money has intrinsic value in addition to its transactions value. Finally, we show that anticipated stabilization reduces demand for commodity money.     

Game and Simulation Experiments

When students become buyers, sellers and producers their learning of economics is accelerated. The inventor of a simulation exercise illustrates this point and comments on the need to keep the computer “hardware” from overwhelming the process of instruction.     

Fiscal forecasting performance in an emerging economy: An empirical assessment of Brazil

This study makes use of Brazilian data to analyze government budget balance forecast errors. Besides the analysis of the quality and efficiency of budget balance forecasts, economic, political, and institutional and governance dimensions are explored. The findings show that the data forecasts have low quality and efficiency. Furthermore, it is observed that the budget forecast error is subject to a backward-looking effect, a bias in the economic growth forecasts, as well as cyclical fluctuations. Finally, electoral cycles represent a source of overestimated forecasts, and strong institutions and governance supported by the public are able to suppress opportunistic motivations in budget forecasts.