Financing investment in environmentally sound technologies: Foreign direct investment versus foreign debt finance

This paper develops a screening model to examine the relationship between alternative sources of private capital and investment in environmentally sound technologies (ESTs). In the model, a polluter (agent) must secure investment funds from the international financial markets in order to upgrade its production and abatement technology. The requisite capital can be obtained via either market loans (debt finance) or foreign direct investment (FDI). Under debt finance, the foreign financier supplies only capital and the relationship between the two parties is more ‘arms-length’. By contrast, under FDI, the investor delivers both capital and managerial skills. We use the model to derive the implications of debt finance for optimal investment decisions and compare them to those obtained under FDI. Investment incentives are more pronounced under debt finance.     

Environmental Regulation: An Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment

Empirical evidence has so far failed to confirm that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment from polluting firms. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, we show that the foreign firm may want to relocate to the domestic country with stricter environmental regulation, when the move raises its rival domestic firm's cost by sufficiently more than its own. The domestic (foreign) country's welfare is (usually) lower with foreign direct investment.     

The merits of horizontal versus vertical FDI in the presence of uncertainty

We examine the impact of uncertainty on vertical and horizontal FDI. Our model shows that greater supply uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical FDI but increases the expected income from horizontal FDI. Greater demand uncertainty adversely affects the expected income under both production modes. Uncertainty about predatory actions by the host country is more costly to the multinational under vertical than under the horizontal mode. We examine sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. parent companies. Conditioning on host-country characteristics thought to influence FDI, we find evidence that volatility and sovereign risk have a greater negative impact on vertical FDI than on horizontal FDI.     

Rural women leaders

This research project was designed to study the determinants of leadership development in rural women. The first phase of the study involved individual interviews with women recognized as leaders within a rural community. Each of the 25 rural women leaders interviewed was raised on a farm or in a community with a population smaller than 2,000. The second phase of the study was administered via Survey Monkey to 133 women using a modified version of the Review of Personal Effectiveness with Locus of control (ROPELOC) instrument, which included the key domains of interest and was expanded to include additional questions focusing on unique challenges to leadership among women living in rural communities. The project used leadership‐related community groups as an entry point to identify women across rural Kansas for the survey. The results from these two methods identified six themes: lifelong learners, bias and discrimination, self‐efficacy and overcoming barriers, community influence and social capital, leadership mentors, and expression of leadership.     

WHY ARE SOME PLACES RICH WHILE OTHERS ARE POOR? THE INSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM

We survey perspectives on the economic differences between countries and argue that economic freedom is the key to prosperity. We close by outlining the policy implications. Specifically, removing obstacles to the exercise of economic freedom is an important step towards prosperity.     

The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The 2010 Merger Guidelines and the Challenge of Judicial Adoption

There is ample justification for the consensus view that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have proven one of antitrust law??s great successes in the grounding of antitrust doctrine within economic learning. The foundation of the Guidelines?? success has been its widespread adoption by federal courts, which have embraced its rigorous underlying economic logic and analytical approach to merger analysis under the Clayton Act. While some have suggested that the Guidelines?? most recent iteration might jeopardize this record of judicial adoption by downplaying the role of market definition and updating its unilateral effects analysis, we believe that these updates are generally beneficial and include long-overdue shifts away from antiquated structural presumptions in favor of analyzing competitive effects directly where possible. However, this article explores a different reason to be concerned that the 2010 Guidelines may not enjoy widespread judicial adoption: the 2010 Guidelines asymmetrically update economic insights underlying merger analysis. While the 2010 Guidelines?? updated economic thinking on market definition and unilateral effects will likely render the prima facie burden facing plaintiffs easier to satisfy in merger analysis moving forward, and thus have significant practical impact, the Guidelines do not correspondingly update efficiencies analysis, leaving it largely as it first appeared 13 years earlier. We discuss two well-qualified candidates for ??economic updates?? of efficiencies analysis under the Guidelines: (1) out-of-market efficiencies and (2) fixed-cost savings. We conclude with some thoughts about the implications of the asymmetric updates for judicial adoption of the 2010 Guidelines.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

Unit determination: National Labor Relations Board rule making in the health care industry

This article reviews the events leading up to the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) historic decision to engage in substantive rule making over appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. It describes the rule-making process and outcomes, and the reaction of hospital unions and management to the rules. Finally, the potential for the use of rule making for other issues facing the NLRB is analyzed. This analysis uses a cost/benefit framework from the agency's perspective to predict the likelihood of future rule making. The article concludes that rule making is sufficiently costly to make extensive use in other situations unlikely.The order of the author's names was determined randomly and should not be interpreted as implying an unequal contribution.