How foreign firms achieve competitive advantage in the Chinese emerging economy: Managerial ties and market orientation

As China experience unprecedented changes in its social, legal, and economic institutions, on what should foreign firms focus more to overcome this challenge, managerial ties or market orientation? This study investigates how managerial ties and market orientation affect competitive advantage and, consequently, firm performance in China. On the basis of a survey of 179 foreign firms in China, we find that both managerial ties and market orientation can lead to firm success—but in different ways. Market orientation enhances firm performance by providing differentiation and cost advantages, whereas managerial ties improve performance through an institutional advantage (i.e., superiority in securing scarce resources and institutional support). Institutional advantage, in turn, leads to differentiation and cost advantages and consequently superior performance.     

Process innovations and firm productivity growth

This article analyses the effect of process innovations on firm total factor productivity growth, explicitly considering the impact of firm size on the nature of this relationship. In particular, we analyse whether firm size affects the life span of the impact of process innovations on productivity growth. The data are drawn from a Spanish survey of manufacturing firms over the period 1991–1998. We use a fully non-parametric methodology based on the concept of stochastic dominance. Our results show that the implementation of process innovations produces an extra productivity growth both for large and small firms. However, this productivity growth is more persistent for large than for small firms.     

浅析会计监督职能

监督是会计的职能,中国加入WTO后,中国会计与国际会计全面接轨,将赋予会计监督更重要的内涵.如何深刻理解会计监督的涵义、内容和作用,怎样看待会计监督中出现的问题,建立什么样的会计监督机制,才能更好地发挥会计监督职能的作用,使国家财产不受损失,是摆在我们面前的重要课题.随着市场经济的发展壮大,人们对与市场经济活动紧密相关的会计也有了崭新的认识,愈来愈认识到会计在社会生产中的重要地位.会计被人们看作是各种主体单位经济活动的综合管理者和信息提供者,与之相适应的会计监督职能必将更好地为发展市场经济服务.会计监督是指会计机构和会计人员凭借经授权的特殊地位和职权,依照特定主体制定的各种合法制度,对特定主体经济活动过程及其引起的资金运动进行综合地、全面地、连续地、及时地监管和督促,以确保各项经济活动的真实、合法、合理,提高会计信息相关性和可靠性,为管理和决策服务.     

管理者与员工间心理契约问题探析

管理者与员工间心理契约的价值在于它考虑了个体的实际问题和需要,通过了解管理者和员工之间真正的相互期望,为管理者在动态中进行管理提供强有力的管理工具,帮助员工更好的进行组织社会化,增强对企业的忠诚度和归属感,进而对提高员工绩效起到积极的促进作用.     

联合匹配性对联合品牌评价的影响研究

大量研究表明联合匹配性是影响品牌联合效应最为关键的因素,然而联合匹配性究竟如何影响联合品牌评价却少有研究涉及。文章从Keller的品牌联想模型出发,通过剖析联合匹配性的基本内涵,构建了联合匹配性二维结构,通过实验研究法检验了联合匹配性的维度结构及其对联合品牌评价的影响。结果表明,联合匹配性主要体现在产品功能互补和品牌形象一致二维度,联合匹配性的二维度均对联合品牌评价有着积极影响,但二维度对联合品牌评价影响的方式和结果有所不同。     

集群租金视角下的创业企业孵化研究

产业集群是创业企业天然的孵化器,在集群区域内创业,可以获得更大的资源优势和能力拓展空间,产生超额利润即集群租金.而企业家对集群租金的追逐,也成为推动集群创业企业建立和发展的内在动力,并贯穿集群创业过程的始终.不过集群内企业家的寻租行为也面临多个潜在约束,如知识吸收能力、创新能力、创业模式、集群租金的周期性特征等,突破这些潜在约束也就成为实现集群创业企业孵化的关键.     

最终控制人类型对投资影响的研究

以中国在沪深两市上市的359家制造业公司2001年至2004年的数据为样本,研究上市公司最终控制人类型对投资的影响。研究发现:最终控制人是国家或者国有法人时,企业显著的存在过度投资,而最终控制人不是国家或者国有法人时,企业显著的存在投资不足。     

Modelling Competition in the Textbook Market: Some Lessons still to Learn

Many European governments still advocate a so-called ‘cultural exception’, intended to protect consumers and smaller bookshops, to keep their book markets isolated from competition. Other countries, with similar aims in mind, have chosen liberalization schemes instead. To reconcile these opposing views, this paper provides a theoretical framework to study the textbook market, depicting it as dominated by two simultaneous forces: horizontal differentiation among booksellers and a vertical relationship between publishers and bookshops. Using this model, we analyse the effects of alternative price schemes on the market structure and how potential benefits from price liberalization are influenced by the number (and size of) booksellers.     

影响企业出口绩效的主要因素实证研究

影响企业出口绩效的主要有出口国环境因素、战略因素和营销因素,就重庆市企业而言,影响因素依次为出口国的政治经济环境、贸易壁垒、出口国的文化地理因素、产品价格差异战略、分销因素、出口目的、广告促销因素、产品因素、价格因素及促销差异战略.为此,重庆市企业应实施科学的国际营销策略,变被动接订单为主动出击,扩大企业规模,建立战略联盟,充分利用网络,积极开拓国际市场.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups. We assume that agents are located in different villages, cities, etc. The groups are the agents of the same village. We introduce a rule for dividing the cost of connecting all agents to the source among the agents taking into account the group structure. We characterize this rule with several desirable properties. We prove that this rule coincides with the Owen value of the TU game associated with the irreducible matrix.