Publishing performance in economics: Spanish rankings (1990–1999)

Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported. We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

新"零售之轮" 理论与生鲜食品零售业态演化

在新"零售之轮"理论的基础上,从讨论我国消费者选择生鲜食品及购买场所的依据开始,分析超市和农贸市场相对于技术边界的市场定位.认为就备货幅宽而言,农贸市场是比超市服务水平更高的生鲜食品零售业态;消费者效用最大化的生鲜食品购买场所选择中,超市便利和舒适的购物环境是占权重较小的消费者评判指标;社会现有的技术边界线制约了生鲜食品超市业态向消费者偏好中心演化.     

Output decline and the demise of the CMEA and the USSR: The case of Hungary

The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget.     

基于生态足迹模型的可持续性度量研究--以吉林省大安市为例

针对吉林省大安市发展现状和存在的严重生态环境问题,运用生态足迹模型,采用多源数据,首次对大安市生态环境的可持续发展状况进行了定量研究;在此基础上,运用相对指标法对可持续发展的量化结果进行分级。研究表明,2001年大安市的生态需求大于生态供给,生态呈现“供不应求”的局面,人均生态赤字为0.56hm2,处于弱不可持续发展状态。     

城市商圈布局的三维动态模型构建与述评

商贸产业是维系一个城市经济运转的原动力之一,城市商圈是这个经济发展动力的重要载体.本文在吸收西方经典商圈理论模型的基础上,结合我国城市商圈发展现状,从外部环境、内部成长和时间三个维度分析其影响因素,构建了城市商圈布局的三维动态模型,以期对城市商圈布局和城市经营提供一定的现实参考价值.     

我国企业危机管理中的对策研究

现代企业在当今复杂多变的商业环境中运营,无时无刻都在面临着各种危机的威胁。本文从我国企业危机管理的现状出发,分析了我国近几年出现过危机的企业产生危机的主要原因,并进而提出了正确处理危机的方法和对策。