Public services for basic needs in Malaysia

This paper reports on results with respect to meeting basic needs from a larger study of the distribution of public expenditure in Malaysia. Both the paper and the larger study heavily rely on a household survey providing data on consumption of public services. The analysis shows that the poorest categories of Malaysians, namely the Malays, rural dwellers, and those living in the North, are the least well served by public utilities. But they are well represented in use of public medical care and primary education. What also emerges is that many of the poor are unable to avail themselves of certain services because their incomes are too low. If more of the poor are to have their children educated to higher levels, the out-of-pocket costs that constitute such a heavy burden for them probably will somehow have to be subsidized. If the poor are universally to have pure water and electricity it appears that fundamental changes will have to be made in policies for pricing the consumption of these services to reduce their rates to the poor.     

Inflation and the formation of expectations

This paper develops a model of expectations which generates paths that are consistent with observations that an acceleration of the monetary growth rate initially raises and eventually lowers real holdings of cash balances. It introduces a two-part expectations hypothesis where individuals are assumed to form expectations about the entire path of the price level and about the short-term inflation rate. Interaction between regressive and extrapolative elements induces a transitory rise in money holdings during the initial phase of inflation as expectations are that the process will reverse itself. Subsequently, as expectations catch up, the decline in desired holdings induces an overshooting of the inflation rate.     

Agency costs of vertical integration—the case of family firms,investor‐owned firms and cooperatives in the French wine industry

Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2–3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance.     

Hardening soft accounting information: Games for planning organizational change

This study provides theory and field evidence on the social process of hardening soft accounting information to make it persuasive for planning organizational change. Accounting information intended to support organizational change is often soft, that is, there is lack of interpersonal agreement about its quality. For example, employees can lack agreement about the quality of accounting information (e.g., activity-based costing) because the information is constructed from subjective information obtained from interviews and surveys. This information can contain unintentional errors as well as intentional distortions that are intended to avoid revealing embarrassing inefficiencies and/or to resist painful organizational change. We use concepts from applied game theory and social psychology to identify from the accounting literature four multi-person games that may be played to harden soft accounting information. These hardening games are characterized in terms of payoffs, players, the comparability of soft accounting information, and the rules of the games that are expected to emerge. We interpret the field evidence as indicating that the hardening games that emerge depend on who the players are and the comparability of their soft accounting information. In addition, we provide evidence on how the rules of the games that harden the information emerge from the players’ social interactions. Finally, we provide evidence on how an organization learns by trial-and-error how to harden soft accounting information by changing the players and the comparability of the soft accounting information.     

French revolution or industrial revolution? A note on the contrasting experiences of England and France up to 1800

At the end of the eighteenth century, England and France both underwent revolutions: France the French Revolution, England the industrial revolution. This note sheds new light on these contrasting experiences in the histories of England and France by looking at the evolution of real consumer prices in London and Paris in the centuries leading up to 1800. Whilst in London, building workers were facing low and stable consumer prices over the period, leaving plenty of scope for a demand-driven consumer revolution (in particular after 1650), their Parisian counterparts had to engage in a year-long grind to maintain a decent living, and often had to cut consumption to make ends meet. The exercise conducted in the present paper gives a quantitative and economic underpinning to the notion that the French revolution did not arise out of nowhere, but rather had its roots in centuries of hardship amongst working class people as they struggled to make a living.     

A GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS

This paper considers a generalization of the Stackelberg model to cover a T‐stage framework with several leaders and followers who compete on quantities. Assuming a linear demand function and constant marginal costs, we introduce constant conjectural variations in order to capture various structures of competition. First, we characterize the equilibrium market outcome. Second, we study the influence of conjectures on welfare. We notably propose a welfare comparison for six symmetric equilibria. Third, we consider convergence analysis, and we also show that the competitive equilibrium is a consistent oligopoly equilibrium.     

Commodity markets through the business cycle

From 2008 to 2011, commodity markets experienced growing attention from the banking industry for various reasons: the summer 2008 oil price swing, the price surge in an ounce of gold, or sharp variations in agricultural prices. As a consequence, can we hypothesize the existence of a global connection between commodities and economic cycles? If these recent events suggest that commodity markets are strongly related to the business cycle, this evidence goes nevertheless against the widespread intuition that commodity markets are a strong source of diversification in a standard cash–bond–equity portfolio. Based on a data-set from 1990 to present, this paper investigates this issue by (i) looking at the reaction of commodity markets to economic news, and (ii) using a Markov regime-switching model to analyse economic regimes and commodity markets as an asset class.     

Employment and Prices in a Simple Macroeconomy

This exercise sets up interlinked labor and goods markets in a classroom macroeconomy. Students with worker roles are endowed with labor that can be consumed or sold to firms that post wages, purchase labor, and produce goods that can be either consumed or sold to workers. The money from sales is used by firms to purchase labor in the next period. Complicated record keeping is avoided by using ordinary playing cards to represent money and goods. The exercise can stimulate a discussion of potential output, unemployment, and the role of money in determining wages and prices. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory macroeconomics classes to teach concepts of the circular flow, real and money wages, unemployment, and labor market equilibrium and in intermediate classes to consider Keynesian and quantity theories. Time required: Fifteen minutes for reading instructions, 30 to 45 minutes for trading (depending on the number of periods), and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one copy of the instructions for each person and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each replicated group of two workers and one firm. No money or other incentives are required.