Post OPA-90 Vessel Oil Transfer Spill Prevention: The Effectiveness of Coast Guard Enforcement

Although oil spills from tanker accidents receive the most publicity, most vessel spills are not the result of accidents but of oil transfer activities. We investigate determinants of the size of vessel oil transfer spills as well as the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement activities in reducing their size. Vessel out-of-water and in-water oil transfer spillage functions are estimated utilizing tobit regression and detailed data on individual vessel oil transfer spills as well as Coast Guard safety/environmental enforcement activity data for the 1991–1995 period. Our estimation results suggest that Coast Guard hull but not machinery inspections are effective in reducing both out-of-water and in-water spills; patrols by air, but not by boat, are effective in reducing out-of-water spills; but neither is effective in reducing in-water spills. The results also show that the type of vessel (oil- and non-oil-cargo), vessel characteristics, vessel operations, weather/visibility conditions, and waterway type are determinants of post OPA-90 vessel oil transfer spills.     

Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility

The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties all have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern′s expected utility. In contrast, players with "quadratic utility" have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Preferences in the Future

Environmental economics has been much occupied with the discount rate, which is the value of future costs and benefits relative to present costsor benefits. But at least as important is the question of whatshould be discounted, that is, what the value of those future environmentalbenefits is to future generations. This paper analyzes the role for futurepreferences and discusses the state of knowledge. I argue that theappropriate discount rate is the market one, and that the real problemis determining future willingness-to-pay. This approach makes clearerthe connection between discounting and the valuation debate.This paper focuses on two features that have been prominent in that debate:existence value and reference dependence. I argue that thereis a vital connection between the two constructs and that this link yieldsimportant implications for future willingness-to-pay.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient.     

进言中国企业:如何攻略美国市场

我们正看到一种趋势初露端倪.这种趋势将很快成为下个10年里中国商业战略的"主流".更多的有战略头脑的中国公司开始在全世界展开直接的兼并业务,尤其是在美国.     

Analysis of Austrian stocks: Testing for stability and randomness

This paper is concerned with subjecting two popular assumptions about the behavior of stock market prices to empirical tests: first, the random walk hypothesis developed by Bachelier (1900), Osborne (1959), and Mandelbrot (1963); second, the stable distributions hypothesis by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965). For this purpose, ten time series from the Vienna Stock Exchange were used. The first hypothesis was tested using both non-parametric and parametric methods. To obtain evidence with regard to the seond hypothesis, a graphical procedure and statistical estimation on the basis of the empirical characteristic function were applied. On analysis of our data, it turned out that, at least for the time period under consideration (1985–1990), severe doubts are cast on the above assumptions.We gratefully acknowledge the help of Peter Mitter, Institute for Advanced Studies, and Franz Köstl, Österreichische Kontrollbank, who provided us with the necessary data, and the comments of the anonymous referees.     

Demographic links to savings in life cycle models: identification of issues for LDCs

The author considers the potential for a link between the recent pattern of demographic transition and intertemporal and inter-country variations in savings rates. Fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, and levels of female and child labor force participation are among the various demographic factors which affect national savings rates through their effects upon age structure, age-specific individual savings behavior, and their general equilibrium effects upon interest rates, wage rates, and income distribution. The author establishes a simple discrete time life cycle model of savings, explains the issues related to age structure, and discusses the effect of age-specific savings functions, the general equilibrium effects of demographic factors, the effects of life expectancies and child mortalities, and the nature of social security coverages in less developed countries, as well as issues which are especially important for less developed countries. A new strategy for empirically evaluating demographic policies is proposed. That is, one can estimate the age profile of earnings, saving and fertility rates from household survey data. The life tables can then be used to compute the aggregate savings rate and population size. Any demographic policy which affects the fertility rate, life expectancy, and investment in the quality of children will change the aggregate saving and population growth rates. These two aggregate effects could be compared to evaluate demographic policies. The author stresses, however, that changes in different demographic factors will have different short-run and long-run effects upon the savings rate which will also depend upon whether such changes are transitory or permanent.     

Industrial relations law,employment security and collective bargaining in India: myths,realities and hopes

This article examines the debate on reforms in industrial relations law in India, needed to support its economic liberalisation programme. Analysing a distinctively Indian experience of state intervention in industrial relations, it concludes that the thrust of the reform should be towards entrusting union recognition and promotion of dispute settlement to an authority that is independent of the state executive.