Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing

I compare the fees, expenses, and trading costs society pays to invest in the U.S. stock market with an estimate of what would be paid if everyone invested passively. Averaging over 1980–2006, I find investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market each year searching for superior returns. Society's capitalized cost of price discovery is at least 10% of the current market cap. Under reasonable assumptions, the typical investor would increase his average annual return by 67 basis points over the 1980–2006 period if he switched to a passive market portfolio.     

Bubbles,Fads and Stock Price Volatility Tests: A Partial Evaluation

This is a summary and interpretation of some of the literature on stock price volatility that was stimulated by Leroy and Porter 28 and Shiller 40 . It appears that neither small-sample bias, rational bubbles nor some standard models for expected returns adequately explain stock price volatility. This suggests a role for some nonstandard models for expected returns. One possibility is a “fads” model in which noise trading by naive investors is important. At present, however, there is little direct evidence that such fads play a significant role in stock price determination.     

OPTIONS IN THE DESIGN OF COMPETITIVE-BIDDING PROCESSES FOR INDIGENT MEDICAL CARE

This paper discusses competitive-bidding systems for indigent medical care. Theoretical and empirical research which applies to the specific characteristics of these systems is limited. In particular, it is not clear which set of bidding rules would result in the lowest program costs for the state. Effectively implementing competitive bidding is difficult, given the ambiguity of available research results, since such bidding creates the appearance that policymakers have relinquished budgetary control.     

An empirical investigation of audit qualification decisions in the presence of going concern uncertainties*

Abstract. This study presents a logistic regression model which is used to identify U.S. companies that are likely to have their financial statements qualified for going concern reasons. The model is developed using financial statement data for a sample of failing companies. Validation tests performed on independent samples of bankrupt and nonbankrupt companies indicate that the model has reasonable explanatory power. The findings from this study indicate that the auditor's qualification for companies in financial distress is correlated with variables derived from financial statement data. The variables that are consistently identified as being closely associated with the auditor's decision whether to qualify his opinion are recurring operating losses and change in a company's liquidity position. Résumé. Cette étude présente un modèle de régression logistique utilisé afin d'identifier les sociétés américaines dont les états financiers sont susceptibles d'être accompagnés d'une opinion avec restriction quant à la permanence de l'entreprise. Le modèle est construit à l'aide de données tirées d'états financiers provenant d'un échantillon d'entreprises en difficultés. Des tests de validation effectués sur des échantillons indépendants de société faillies et non-faillies, indiquent que le modèle démontre une capacité explicative acceptable. Les résultats de cette étude montrent une corrélation entre, d'une part, l'opinion avec restriction dans le cas de sociétés en difficultés financières et entre, d'autre part, des variables tirées des données d'états financiers. Les variables qui sont régulièrement identifiées comme étant reliées de près à la décision du vérificateur d'émettre un rapport avec restriction, sont les pertes d'exploitation répétitives et la variation dans la position de trésorerie d'une société.     

The Role of Insider Influence in Mutual-to-Stock Conversions

Using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we show that the level of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance. We conclude that unanticipated inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence the level of expected initial public offer (IPO) returns. We find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower offer size and higher initial returns, but we do not find a relationship between inside participation and post-IPO performance.     

Does the Scope of the Sell‐Side Analyst Industry Matter? An Examination of Bias,Accuracy, and Information Content of Analyst Reports

We examine changes in the scope of the sell‐side analyst industry and whether these changes impact information dissemination and the quality of analysts’ reports. Our findings suggest that changes in the number of analysts covering an industry impact analyst competition and have significant spillover effects on other analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias, report informativeness, and effort. These spillover industry effects are incremental to the effects of firm level changes in analyst coverage. Overall, a more significant sell‐side analyst industry presence has positive externalities that can result in better functioning capital markets.