Residential energy consumption: Models of consumer behavior and their implications for rate design

This article illustrates the use of bounded rationality concepts in policy analysis. Specifically, we discuss reasons why we expect residential energy consumption to deviate from the utility-maximizing level when multiple-tier rate structures are in use. Then we construct a simple, predictive model of boundedly-rational household behavior which can be tested against a conventional utility-maximization model. Our model predicts that households will over-consume when facing increasing tier rates and under-consume when facing decreasing tier rates.We then discuss some of the policy consequences of this behavior. One consequence, given the kind of increasing tier structures that are common in the United States, is that the magnitude of the overconsumption for a household is plausibly 10 percent in the short-run and 50 percent in the long-run. Another consequence, if policy is constrained to increasing tier rates with constant total consumer subsidy, is that the most efficient of these is likely to have a lower first-tier price and quantity than would be the case without bounded rationality. Finally, we note that both the bounded-rationality model and the utility-maximizing model support the use of a two-part tariff rate structure over tiered rate structures for residential consumers.

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Energieverbrauch privater Haushalte: Modelle des Verbraucherverhaltens und ihre Implikationen für die Tarifgestaltung

Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag wendet das Konzept eingeschränkter Rationalität auf energiepolitische Zusammenhänge an. Es wird insbesondere erörtert, wie sich der Energieverbrauch privater Haushalte unter der Annahme eingeschränkter Rationalität von dem unterscheidet, wie er sich bei vollständiger Rationalität (Nutzenmaximierung) ergeben würde — vorausgesetzt, es gilt ein mehrfach gestaffelter Tarif. Die Autoren stellen ein einfaches Vorhersagemodell beschränkt rationalen Haushaltsverhaltens vor, das gegen ein konventionelles Nutzen-Maximierungsmodell getestet werden kann. Nach diesem Modell werden Haushalte bei progressiv gestaffelten Tarifen zu Überkonsum und bei degressiv gestaffelten Tarifen zu Unterkonsum tendieren.Anschließend werden einige politische Konsequenzen dieses Verhaltens diskutiert. Bei der Form progressiv gestaffelter Tarife, die in den USA üblich ist, ist eine Konsequenz, daß die Größenordnung des Mehrverbrauchs eines Haushaltes bei kurzfristiger Betrachtung bei 10%, bei längerfristiger Betrachtung bei 50% liegt. Wenn sich die Tarifpolitik auf progressiv gestaffelte Stufentarife mit konstanter Gesamtversorgung beschränkt, ist eine andere Konsequenz, daß die wirkungsvollste Tarifgestaltung bei beschränkter Rationalität einen niedrigeren Eingangstarif und eine niedrige Eingangsmenge fordert. Schließlich wird ausgeführt, daß sowohl das Modell eingeschränkter Rationalität wie auch das Nutzen-Maximierungs-Modell für einen zweistufigen Tarif anstelle eines mehrfach gestaffelten Tarifs spricht.

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Lee S. Friedman is Professor of Public Policy in the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. Karl Hausker is a staff Economist at the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 358, Washington, D.C. 20510, USA.The authors are grateful to the University of California Energy Research Group for its support of this research. They would like to thank Suzanne Scotchmer, the Editors, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation,Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how her decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.     

Social decisions and public investment

If society adopts a Pareto-optimal sharing rule, it will, under some strong assumptions, be able to make risky investment decisions with unanimity.     

Quantitative Assessment of U.S. Wheat Performance for Quality Characteristics

Quality of U. S. grain exports has been a contentious issue over the past decade. Nowhere is the issue more hotly debated than for wheat. At the core of the debate has been the ability of Canada to command a premium for its wheat in foreign markets. Buyers' perceptions of quality have been suggested as an explanation, but empirical evidence on the quality attributes responsible for this country-of-origin premium has been limited to hedonic pricing studies. This paper quantifies purchasers' perceptions of the relative importance of quality characteristics for the world's major importing countries. This is done by calculating three indices. The attainment index measures how well buyers' perceptions of the importance of the characteristic matches buyers' perceptions of how well it is being supplied. The supply index measures buyers' perceptions on how well a characteristic is being supplied. The demand index measures how important the buyers perceive a particular characteristic to be. Then buyers' perceptions of the performance of U.S. and Canadian wheats are evaluated, given the perceived importance of each characteristic, and related to previous empirical results. Finally, these results are compared for alternative groupings of importing countries.