Is novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics

Evolutionary economists are increasingly interested in developing policy implications. As a rule, contributions in this field implicitly assume that policy should focus on the encouragement of learning and innovation. We argue that, from an individualistic perspective, this position is not easy to justify. Novelty and evolutionary change have in fact a rather complex normative dimension. In order to cope with this, the evolutionary approach to policy-making needs to be complemented with an account of welfare the background assumptions of which are compatible with an evolutionary world-view. Standard welfare economics is unsuited to the job, since the orthodox way to conceptualize welfare as the satisfaction of given and rational preferences cannot be applied in a world in which preferences tend to be variable and incoherent. We argue that, in order to deal with the specific normative issues brought up in an evolving economy, welfare should be conceptualized in a procedural way: At the individual level, it should be understood as the capacity and motivation to engage in the ongoing learning of instrumentally effective preferences. Evolutionary-naturalistic insights into the way human agents bring about, value, and respond to novelty-induced change turn out to be a valuable input into this extended concept of welfare. Finally, some implications of this concept are explored.     

Evolutionary economics and the case for a constitutional libertarian paternalism—a comment on Martin Binder, “should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?”

In his article “Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?”(Journal of Evolutionary Economics 24(3), 2014, 515–539) Martin Binder discusses the pros and cons of “libertarian paternalism” (LP) from an explicitly evolutionary viewpoint, concluding that as a general rule, evolutionary economists should be cautious regarding this new and highly influential policy approach. In this comment I argue that Binder starts from an incomplete model of the institutional status quo and neglects an obvious alternative to the standard variant of LP, namely, a constitutionally constrained LP. Most of Binder’s objections do not apply with equal force to such a refined variant of LP.     

Innovation and export activities in the German mechanical engineering sector: an application of testing restrictions in production analysis

Since Solow (Q J Econ 70:65–94, 1956) the economic literature has widely accepted innovation and technological progress as the central drivers of long-term economic growth. From the microeconomic perspective, this has led to the idea that the growth effects on the macroeconomic level should be reflected in greater competitiveness of the firms. Although innovation effort does not always translate into greater competitiveness, it is recognized that innovation is, in an appropriate sense, unique and differs from other inputs like labor or capital. Nonetheless, often this uniqueness is left unspecified. We analyze two arguments rendering innovation special, the first related to partly non-discretionary innovation input levels and the second to the induced increase in the firm’s competitiveness on the global market. Methodologically the analysis is based on restriction tests in non-parametric frontier models, where we use and extend tests proposed by Simar and Wilson (Commun Stat Simul Comput 30(1):159–184, 2001; J Prod Anal, forthcoming, 2010). The empirical data is taken from the German Community Innovation Survey 2007 (CIS 2007), where we focus on mechanical engineering firms. Our results are consistent with the explanation of the firms’ inability to freely choose the level of innovation inputs. However, we do not find significant evidence that increased innovation activities correspond to an increase in the ability to serve the global market.     

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

中国地方治理改革、政治参与和政治合法性初探

改革开放以来,中国社会利益分化和利益多样化趋势日益明显,利益主体的权利意识也在逐步苏醒.利益主体通过各种方式向各级党委和政府反映自身利益和要求,力图影响政策制订过程.为了回应公民的要求,地方党委和政府进行了治理改革.本文就探讨了这些地方治理改革与创新是否提高了公民的政治意识,促进了政治参与,增强了政权的政治合法性等问题.     

How long can excess pollution persist? The non-cooperative case

This paper describes a world composed of two (groups of) countries, which derive their utility from a polluting activity and from the enjoyment of a common environmental quality. The initial situation is both suboptimal and unsustainable: pollution leads to a continuous deterioration of environmental quality. The two countries have heterogeneous preferences for the environment, which are private knowledge. This prevents the adoption of abatement policies negotiated between the two countries, because each one has a strong incentive to announce in every negotiation an arbitrarily low preference for the environment. The two countries then engage in a war of attrition, each of them postponing abatement policies, in the hope that the other will concede first and abate more. We study for how long the adjustment is postponed, according to initial conditions, the greenness of the greenest country, the possible range of preferences and the rates of discount and natural regeneration.