Bank capital regulation, diversification loss and the probability of bank failure

This paper investigates the effect of bank capital regulation on the probability of bank failure. Utilizing a two-parameter approach, it is shown that the relationship between bank capital ratio and probability of bank failure is not necessarily negative, and that capital ratio regulation may increase the probability of bank failure. This is because an increase in bank capital ratio may lead to diversification loss via a decrease in the number of borrowers to which a bank offers loans.     

Why Environmentalists Resist Trade Liberalization

We build a two-country differential game model of polluting oligopoly to consider the effects of trade liberalization. As in static models, the opening of trade promotes competition but expands global pollution. Characterizing open-loop and feedback strategies, we derive a sufficient condition for losses from trade. This losses-from-trade proposition could provide a rationale for persistent resistance to globalization by environmentalists.     

Uninsurable risk and financial market puzzles

We compare the empirical performances of three risk-sharing arrangements involving idiosyncratic skill shocks: (a) where individuals are unable to directly insure their consumption against individual-specific shocks, (b) where agents strike long-term insurance contract with financial intermediaries involving a truth revelation constraint as in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), (c) full risk sharing. Based on the widely accepted assumption of cross-sectional log-normality of individual consumption levels, we work out closed form expressions of the pricing kernels for (a) and (b). We put these three models to test four financial market anomalies, namely the equity premium, currency premium, risk-free rate, and consumption-real exchange rate puzzles simultaneously in an integrated framework. We find that the pricing kernel associated with (a) outperforms the other two models in terms of the produced estimates of the agent’s preference parameters and the model ability to predict the equity and currency premia, the risk-free rate, and the log growth in the exchange rate. However, the predictive ability is still far from satisfactory for all three models under scrutiny.     

A Win–Win–Win Tariff–Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Taking into account non‐constant marginal costs, this paper considers the effects of a tariff cut combined with a consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. We show that welfare, government revenue, and market access can all improve with this policy reform under decreasing marginal costs. This result may provide a theoretical rationale for the above policy reform, which is guided by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.     

Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methods of IPO Issuance? Evidence from Japan

We examine Japan's 1997 introduction of book building as analternative to a previously required hybrid auction method.Despite higher cost for some issuers, all issuers in Japan nowselect book building. Book building enables more accurate valuationof firms, but gains from accurate valuation are partly redistributive.Thus book building can drive auction-method offerings from themarket even if it yields no aggregate benefit. Compared to theauction regime, book building reduces issue costs for largeissuers. Auctioning is less costly for small issuers, but appearsto foreclose some small firms from issuing. The aggregate costsof book building and auctioning are similar.     

Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly

A model of differentiated mixed oligopoly is developed to systematically discuss the welfare consequences of partial privatization of a public firm. We analytically derive the optimal degree of partial privatization not only in the short run with restricted entry but also in the long run with free entry. It is shown that the short-run optimal policy is non-monotonic in the degree of love of variety, while the optimal degree of privatization is monotonically increasing in the consumer's preference for variety in the long run.      

Tourism,Capital and Labor Inflows and Regional Development

International Advances in Economic Research - The paper considers an open rural region of a developed country with two sectors, an environmentally sensitive agricultural industry and locally...     

Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market

This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.