An estimate of black gross job losses due to reduced defense expenditures

The reduction in defense expenditures, due to the end of the cold war, is estimated to have a disproportionately heavy impact on black gross job losses. Several solutions are discussed with the hope that if they are successful, the negative social behavior that is often associated with increased joblessness can be ameliorated.     

Net foreign assets of Dutch commercial banks: A comment

Conclusion The article provides a contribution to the discussion on the net foreign assets of the commerical banks, by drawing renewed attention to the possible passivity of the banking sector, which has gained topicality with the striking developments of 1989. Indeed, the banking sector may be considerably more reactive in regards to net foreign assets formation than has been assumed by various authors and in macroeconometric models on the basis of portfolio optimizing behaviour. However, due to the above-mentioned methodological and empirical shortcomings, Bakkers's study certainly does not provide the final answer to this question.     

Public utility valuation and risk under incentive regulation

The objective of providing inducements for public utilities to seek to improve the efficiency of their operations has been a longstanding regulatory concern. Among the evolving strategies for furthering that objective is a shift toward what has come to be referred to as incentive regulation. We examine here how this departure from past regulatory practice will affect the market value and market risk of the utility firm, and the specific manner in which an incentive mechanism can be implemented in order to achieve a desired valuation outcome. A particular focus is the establishment of boundaries on allowed rates of return under incentive regulation which are consistent with that desired outcome. The likely impact on utility ratepayers is considered.     

Cross-sectional and time-series momentum returns and market dynamics: evidence from Japan

We test the behavioural theories of overconfidence and underreaction on cross-sectional (CS) and time-series (TS) momentum returns in the Japanese stock markets. Both CS and TS momentum returns are large and significant when the market continues in the same state and turns into losses when the market transitions to another state, consistent with the overconfidence but not the underreaction model. We find that TS conditional momentum returns exceed conditional CS momentum returns because of its active position since TS takes a net long (short) position following UP (DN) markets while CS is a zero-cost strategy irrespective of the market state. Finally, we find no relation between idiosyncratic volatility (IV) and momentum returns which is not supportive of either the overconfidence or underreaction model but implies that IV is not a significant limit to arbitrage in Japan.     

HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION ON HOSPITAL FINANCIAL OUTCOMES

This study examines the effect of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion on hospital financial outcomes. A key innovation relative to prior studies is that we explicitly account for heterogeneity across states in the timing and extent of the expansion as well as across hospital types. We find that Medicaid expansion led to a decrease in uncompensated care expenditures and an increase in average operating margins. The effects were larger in states where the Medicaid expansion led to a greater increase in program eligibility. Operating margins improved most for public hospitals and facilities located in rural areas. (JEL I11, I13, I18)     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜbersetzt von Gerhard Tintner, WienÜbersetzt von Ragnar Nurkse, z. Zt. Wienaus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried, WienÜbersetzt von Paul Brüll, Wien.Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried.     

Rock Paper Scissors

Rock Paper Scissors is used to resolve conflict when a compromise is not possible. Individuals playing ``games' tend to have biases they prefer to play. I show that Rock Paper Scissors with biased players results in a player with a high valuation for winning being victorious with a probability greater than a player with a low valuation. Thus, it frequently achieves the efficient outcome. Furthermore, as the benefit to victory increases for all players, victory for each player becomes equally likely. Therefore, it is often efficient for minor conflicts while it performs no better than a coin-flip for major conflicts.