Buyer–Supplier and Supplier–Supplier Alliances: Do They Reinforce or Undermine One Another?

abstract    Previous research has portrayed buyer–supplier and supplier–supplier alliances as important mechanisms to foster learning and exchange efficiencies. Controversy remains, however, as to how these alliances interact. While some propose they reinforce one another (e.g. learning in horizontal ties generates positive spillovers to vertical ties), others propose a negative interplay (e.g. when increasing vertical-tie intensity, suppliers may weaken horizontal ties to avoid retaliation from buyers who wish to preserve bargaining power). We empirically test these competing views using survey data from the Brazilian auto-parts industry. In an attempt at reconciliation, we propose that the positive or negative interaction between vertical and horizontal alliances depends on the level of technological uncertainty of goods exchanged. Vertical ties seem to inhibit horizontal ties when technological uncertainty is low; when technological uncertainty is higher, vertical and horizontal ties do not seem to have any meaningful form of interaction. We discuss implications for theory and practice.     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

The inequality trap. A comparative analysis of social spending between 1880 and 1930

It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the welfare state. However, using social transfers as an indicator of redistribution and three alternative proxies for inequality—the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, and the share of non‐family farms—this article shows that inequality did not favour the development of social policy between 1880 and 1930. On the contrary, social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, suggesting that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.     

Managers, investors, and crises: mutual fund strategies in emerging markets

We examine the trading strategies of mutual funds in emerging markets. We develop a method for disentangling the behavior of fund managers from that of underlying investors. For both managers and investors, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no momentum trading: mutual funds systematically sell losers and buy winners. Selling current losers and buying current winners is stronger during crises, and equally strong for managers and investors. Selling past losers and buying past winners is stronger for managers. Managers and investors also practice contagion trading—they sell (buy) assets from one country when asset prices fall (rise) in another.     

Good standing and cooperation

Indirect reciprocity is generally considered one of the leading mechanisms to explain how cooperation may emerge by natural selection. The basic intuition is that establishing a reputation of being a helpful individual increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed to describe how indirect reciprocity may work: the standing model (Sugden 1986/2004 in The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.) and the image-scoring model (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a in Nature 393:573–577, b in J Theoretical Biol 194:561–574). Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an implausibly large capacity of processing recursive information. In this paper, I argue that this is not actually the case. I further emphasize that even if the hypothesis of indirect reciprocity is unable to give a fair account of the ecological bases of cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences.     

A social welfare function characterizing competitive equilibria of incomplete financial markets

A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies with missing financial markets.We give such a characterization for economies with a single commodity and missing financial markets, by an amended social welfare function. Its parameters capture both the relative importance of households welfare, through the classic welfare weights, as well as the disagreements among them as to the value of the missing markets.As a by-product, we identify the dimension of the set of interior equilibrium allocations.     

Employee perspectives on communication and consultation: findings from a cross-national survey

Highlighting the ongoing significance of national models of employment relations, this paper examines whether variation in communication and consultation practices between countries is reflected in employee perceptions. Drawing upon a survey of around 3,500 employees in four European countries – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – the paper explores whether workers' views on various aspects of communication and consultation are similar or different. It finds that there are certain similarities, with particular types of information and forms of communication being valued across the countries. However, differences are also identified. It is suggested that national institutions may well shape employee expectations about the nature of communication and consultation, feeding through to how satisfied they are with these processes.     

Speeding Up the Pace of New Product Development

This study empirically investigates a wide array of factors that have been argued to differentiate fast from slow innovation processes from the perspective of the research and development organization. We test the effects of strategic orientation (criteria- and scope-related variables) and organizational capability (staffing- and structuring-related variables) on the speed of 75 new product development projects from ten large firms in several industries. Backward-elimination regression analysis revealed that (a) clear time-goals, longer tenure among team members, and parallel development increased speed, whereas (b) design for manufacturability, frequent product testing, and computer-aided design systems decreased speed. However, when projects were sorted by magnitude of change, different factors were found to influence the speed of radical and incremental projects. Moreover, some factors that sped up radical innovation (e.g., concept clarity, champion presence, co-location) were found to slow down incremental innovation. Together, the radical and incremental models explain differences in speed better than the general model. This suggests a contingency approach to speeding up innovation. Implications for researchers and managers are discussed.