The Application of Mathematical Programming Approaches to Estimating Container Port Production Efficiency

Container terminal production is both an important and complicated element in the contemporary global economy. This paper aims to evaluate the efficiency of the world’s most important container ports and terminals using the two alternative techniques of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model. The results give an insight into the current efficiency ranking of the world’s major container ports and terminals. They also confirm expectations that the available mathematical programming methodologies lead to different results and that appropriate variable definition of input and output factors is a crucial element in meaningful applications of DEA and FDH. It is also concluded that the availability of panel data, rather than cross-sectional data would greatly improve the validity of the efficiency estimates derived from all the mathematical programming techniques applied.JEL Classification:C61, D24, E23, L23, L25, L92     

Don’t kill the messenger! Whistle-blowing in America — A review with recommendations

Whistle-blowing in America business and industry has increased as interest in ethical business behavior and the cost of unethical behavior have grown. Whistle-blowing plays the important role of helping to fill the gaps in the regulatory system that is designed to check the abuse of organizational power. However, the practice of whistle-blowing is controversial and whistle-blowers often pay a high price for their actions. Firms can engage in a number of actions to encourage whistle-blowing. Creating a climate that encourages employees to report organizational wrong doing and that protects the whistle-blower is critical. To create such a climate the organization must build trust and cooperation by educating employees in the benefits of ethical and legal behavior.     

Taxation and household portfolio composition: US evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of financial assets that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets. It analyzes data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys. The empirical findings suggest that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions. The probability that a household owns tax-advantaged assets, such as tax-exempt bonds or assets held in tax-deferred accounts, is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income. In addition, the portfolio share invested in corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets, is increasing in the household’s ordinary income tax rate. Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share of wealth as a household’s marginal tax rate increases.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising

This article provides evidence on the determinants of royaltiesand upfront fees in share contracts by examining how state franchisetermination laws affect franchise contracts. The results areconsistent with the joint hypothesis that the two-sided moralhazard model explains the terms in franchise contracts and thattermination laws increase the relative importance of franchisoreffort (due to the extra effort that is required to controlsystem quality). I find that franchise companies that are headquarteredin termination-law states charge significantly higher royaltyrates than companies headquartered in other states (around 1%higher). Correspondingly, the initial franchise fees are lowerfor companies headquartered in termination states. Overall,franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in stateswith protection laws. Consistent with a basic tenet of law andeconomics, price adjustments appear to offset at least someof the transfers that would otherwise be implied by the laws.     

Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation

This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.     

RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND PRO SPORTS LEAGUES

We put a new set of shoes on that old workhorse, the competitive talent market (CTM) model in sports economics. There exist unique rational expectations equilibria for both national football league (NFL‐type leagues) and major league baseball (MLB‐type leagues) under the CTM model. A cursory statistical test fails to reject the empirical implications for the NFL‐type league. The model also suggests empirical tests of whether or not talent demand (marginal revenues from talent), including induced effects, actually slopes down. But like all models, the competitive talent model should be applied in its context. It describes highly cooperative North American sports leagues that have a wealth of common information. But it may not do the same for other leagues if they lack this common information.     

Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.     

On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty in Mexico

We estimate an augmented multivariate GARCH-M model of inflation and output growth for Mexico at business cycle frequencies. The main findings are: (1) inflation uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on growth; (2) once the effect of inflation uncertainty is accounted for, lagged inflation does not have a direct negative effect on output growth; (3) However as predicted by Friedman and Ball, higher average inflation raises inflation uncertainty, and the overall net effect of average inflation on output growth in Mexico is negative. That is, average inflation is harmful to Mexican growth due to its impact on inflation uncertainty. (4) The Mexican Presidential election cycle significantly raises inflation uncertainty both during the year of the election and the year following the election which has correspondingly negative effects on output growth.