Telecommunications planning and the power of expertise

The article points out the often neglected political importance of telecommunications planning experts. It does so by first locating policy planning in the larger socletal phenomenon of technocracy. Next discussed is the relationship of policy planners to political power. Finally the article examines some instances of national telecommunications planning, in particular the USA.     

PRICING FAST-PAY MORTGAGES: SOME SIMULATION RESULTS

The mortgage market has undergone rapid change in recent years, particularly in the introduction of alternative mortgage instruments. This paper explores one such instrument, the fast-pay (early equity) mortgage. Specifically, in this paper the focus is on how this type of mortgage would be priced relative to the standard conventional mortgage using historical yield data.     

Pricing of related products by a multiproduct monopolist

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a multiproduct monopolist (MPM). For a firm selling two products, the profit maximizing price of a particular item is found to depend upon its marginal cost, the own and cross-price elasticities and the budget shares of both products. Conditions are identified under which the price charged by a MPM will be greater than, less than, and equal to the price charged by an otherwise identical single product monopolist as well as the circumstances under which it is profitable for a MPM to utilize one product as a loss leader.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

The Strategic Management of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Developing a Resource-based Perspective

There is a growing recognition within resource-based theory that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can play an important role as a means of transferring otherwise non-marketable resources and capabilities. However, this resource-based view has yet to consider in detail the management process issues involved. This paper looks at three cases from the pharmaceutical industry and seeks to begin the development of a resource-based perspective on the management of M&A.     

Strategy-proof Location on a Network

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.     

THE EARNINGS-PRICE AND STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED EARNINGS EFFECTS: ONE ANOMALY OR TWO?

In this paper prior work on earnings-price (E/P) and standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) anomalies is re-examined and extended. A relation between excess returns and E/P is tested controlling for SUE. Results suggest that both anomalies are still present in the data, and that the E/P effect exists independently of the most recent earnings surprise.