Revealed preference and differentiable demand

Summary. We prove that, for finitely many demand observations, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference tests not only the existence of a strictly concave, strictly monotone and continuous utility generator, but also one that generates an infinitely differentiable demand function. Our results extend those of previous related results (Matzkin and Richter, 1991; Chiappori and Rochet, 1987), yielding differentiable demand functions but without requiring differentiable utility functions.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 5 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D12. Correspondence to: Kam-Chau WongThis is a much revised version of Lee and Wong (2001). We are grateful to the Referee for valuable suggestions. We also thank Professor Marcel K. Richter for his comments.     

On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty in Mexico

We estimate an augmented multivariate GARCH-M model of inflation and output growth for Mexico at business cycle frequencies. The main findings are: (1) inflation uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on growth; (2) once the effect of inflation uncertainty is accounted for, lagged inflation does not have a direct negative effect on output growth; (3) However as predicted by Friedman and Ball, higher average inflation raises inflation uncertainty, and the overall net effect of average inflation on output growth in Mexico is negative. That is, average inflation is harmful to Mexican growth due to its impact on inflation uncertainty. (4) The Mexican Presidential election cycle significantly raises inflation uncertainty both during the year of the election and the year following the election which has correspondingly negative effects on output growth.     

Improving perishable product inventory management using goal programming

The multiple objectives of perishable product inventory management are examined in this paper. These objectives include: (1) satisfying demand by carrying sufficient inventories, (2) holding down inventory carrying costs, (3) keeping the amount of product spoilage (outdating) at an acceptable level, and (4) maintaining quality by using the product while it is still fresh, and (5) keeping the cost of rotation low. Some of the above objectives are in conflict. Thus, certain redistribution policies may help attain one or more of these objectives to a greater extent. Redistribution involves the transfer of the product from outlets where demand is low to outlets where demand is high. A goal programming model for solving redistribution problems is presented. An example is provided and sensitivity analysis is performed in order to determine when redistribution is advantageous. Applicability of the model is discussed.     

Who Gains from the Demographic Dividend? Forecasting Income by Age

Changes in the population age structure are known to influence the total income per person, but little is known about whether the changes are equally shared across the population or are concentrated on particular age groups and/or birth cohorts. The answer to this question has potentially important implications for income inequality, human capital investment, and fertility decision-making. We propose a new model of intergenerational transfers which distinguishes between the effects of changes in population structure and the effects of changes in family age structure. Using age-specific data from annual income and expenditure surveys of Taiwan between 1978 and 1998, we show that changes in age structure have had a very favorable effect on Taiwan's income growth. The gains are not equally shared by all age groups, however. Children and young adults have benefited the most, while the elderly have benefited the least. The population and family age structures have independent effects on per capita income; the effect of the population age structure is most important. Generational differences in per capita income are closely related to intergenerational differences in earnings, suggesting only a weak form of altruism. Finally, we predict that, on average, population aging will adversely influence the per capita income growth in Taiwan in the coming decades.     

Tax–preferred savings accounts and marginal tax rates: evidence on RRSP participation

The effect of taxes on participation in Registered Retirement Savings Plans between 1982 and 1996 is studied. Interprovincial changes in the tax structure over this period provide identifying variation. Using this variation, I find that taxes influence households' participation decisions, but more weakly than previously estimated. A 10 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate is estimated to increase the probability of participation by 8 per cent. This explains only 5.1 per cent of the trend in participation. I also find suggestive evidence that the carryforward mechanism may be used as an instrument for tax base smoothing. JEL Classification: H24
Comptes d'épargne fiscalement privilégiés et taux marginaux d'imposition : résultats sur la participation aux régimes enregistrés d'épargne retraite (REER). Ce mémoire étudie les effets du régime d'imposition sur la participation aux régimes enregistrés d'épargne retraite (REER) entre 1982 et 1996. Les changements dans la structure d'imposition d'une province à l'autre au cours de la période fournissent un éventail de possibilités. Utilisant cet éventail, l'auteur découvre que le régime fiscal influence les décisions de participer des ménages, mais plus faiblement qu'on l'avait estimé précédemment. Un accroissement de 10 pour cent dans le taux marginal d'imposition accroît la probabilité de participation de 8 pour cent. Voilà qui explique seulement 5,1 pour cent de la tendance dans la participation. L'auteur découvre aussi que le mécanisme de report dans le temps de la portion inutilisée de la contribution aux REER peut être utilisé comme instrument de lissage de la base de revenus imposables.     

Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court

The foundation upon which accounts of policy-motivated behaviorof Supreme Court justices are built consists of assumptionsabout the policy preferences of the justices. To date, mostscholars have assumed that the policy positions of Supreme Courtjustices remain consistent throughout the course of their careersand most measures of judicial ideology—such as Segal andCover scores—are time invariant. On its face, this assumptionis reasonable; Supreme Court justices serve with life tenureand are typically appointed after serving in other politicalor judicial roles. However, it is also possible that the worldviews,and thus the policy positions, of justices evolve through thecourse of their careers. In this article we use a Bayesian dynamicideal point model to investigate preference change on the USSupreme Court. The model allows for justices' ideal points tochange over time in a smooth fashion. We focus our attentionon the 16 justices who served for 10 or more terms and completedtheir service between the 1937 and 2003 terms. The results arestriking—14 of these 16 justices exhibit significant preferencechange. This has profound implications for the use of time-invariantpreference measures in applied work.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

The Effect of Respondent Experience/Knowledge in the Elicitation of Contingent Values: An Investigation of Convergent Validity,Procedural Invariance and Reliability

Tests of convergent validity and procedural invariance were used to investigate whether individuals lacking direct experience with a commodity can provide valid responses to contingent-valuation questions eliciting ex post use values. Convergent validity between samples with and without experience was shown to hold for dichotomous-choice responses, but not for open-ended responses.