A two price theory of financial equilibrium with risk management implications

Financial primitives are introduced to define acceptable loss exposures when demands and supplies are defined on differing event spaces. Acceptable loss exposures are modeled by a convex cone of random variables containing the nonnegative random variables. The resulting financial equilibrium defines in general a two price economy. Analytical procedures for identifying the two prices are described. The size of the two price economy is fundamentally determined by the financial system that determines the size of the cone of acceptable losses. There are implications for accounting and risk management as liabilities would typically be valued at ask while assets are valued at bid with no data available on bidirectional prices for anything. Marking to market in such financial economies is at best marking to two price economies.     

THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON NEW HOUSE PRICES

It is often stated that real house prices respond to inflation in ways similar to assets infixed supply, such as gold or antiques. This paper proposes that, instead, house prices are determined primarily by the cost of producing new houses. Thus, inflation affects price mainly through input markets and through expansion in housing starts. This proposition is supported in an examination of annual changes in house prices between 1965 and 1982 in 12 sub regions of the United States     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

A comparative analysis of multiattribute attitude models

In the consumer behavior context, multiattribute attitude models used to predict consumer choice in multiple criteria decision making situations have produced mixed results. Prediction of consumer behavior from attitudes, consequently, has been highly debated in recent years with researchers using beliefs-only, full, and extended multiattribute attitude models. The research underlying this paper was designed to compare the predictive superiority of the beliefs-only model, the full multiattribute attitude model, and a new representation identified as the combined multiattribute/determinant attribute attitude model. Data concerning patronage of fast-food chains were collected from a student panel for seven weeks. Predictive superiority was determined by average adjusted R² using the patronage behavior dependent variable. All models were tested in aggregated and disaggregated form.     

Job security regulations and the dynamic demand for industrial labor in India and Zimbabwe

Government permission is required to dismiss or lay off even a single worker in India and Zimbabwe. Dynamic labor demand equations, derived from a CES cost minimization model, are estimated for 64 manufacturing industries in these two countries. The data reveal a substantial reduction in demand for workers but no slowing in adjustment of number of employees following enactment of the labor laws. In India, no comparable reduction in labor demand occurred in small scale plants uncovered by the job security regulations. Among larger Indian plants, the drop in labor demand is estimated to be largest in industries where: coverage of the legislation is more extensive, private ownership dominates, and there are fewer union members.     

When no news is good news

For as long as can be remembered, BestBaby Corporation, a manufacturer of baby equipment and furniture, has enjoyed a solid reputation with retailers, a good track record with consumers, and a supportive relationship with stockholders. But then the child of a celebrity is injured when her stroller tips over because its brakes failed. The media go wild, and CEO Greg James finds himself in uncharted territory. The morning after the accident, Greg calls an emergency meeting of his executive staff. As he searches his memory to prepare for it, he thinks about Arzep Enterprises, BestBaby's main provider of parts and materials. He remembers his COO, Keith Sigismund, telling him that Arzep had switched suppliers at some point in order to cut its own costs. Nevertheless, Keith had assured Greg that the new material, although not quite as sturdy, hadn't affected the quality of Arzep's components. By the time the meeting is set to begin, several employees have threatened to quit, and stories are surfacing in the press and on the Web about other consumers who have had problems with their strollers. Then in the meeting, Keith drops a bombshell: he reads from a year-old memo sent to him by an employee in manufacturing stating that the new brake fittings delivered by Arzep don't grab the front brakes as well as the ones previously supplied. The same employee, and others, had complained in the past that Keith hadn't adequately attended to concerns they brought up to him. In this fictional case study, four commentators offer advice to Greg on how BestBaby should respond to the victim's family, the media, the public, and the company's own employees during this PR crisis.     

Preference for equivalent random variables: A price for unbounded utilities

Savage's expected utility theory orders acts by the expectation of the utility function for outcomes over states. Therefore, preference between acts depends only on the utilities for outcomes and the probability distribution of states. When acts have more than finitely many possible outcomes, then utility is bounded in Savage's theory. This paper explores consequences of allowing preferences over acts with unbounded utility. Under certain regularity assumptions about indifference, and in order to respect (uniform) strict dominance between acts, there will be a strict preference between some pairs of acts that have the same distribution of outcomes. Consequently in these cases, preference is not a function of utility and probability alone.